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CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION: THE 1951 AND 1952
PRICE CONTROL AMENDMENTS
JAIES A. DURHA1ft
WHILE rearmament and cold war persist, inflation, whether present or
potential, will remain a national hazard. Its universal impact makes inflation
a problem which no Administration can neglect; recent efforts to repress it will
almost surely continue after the inauguration of President Eisenhower next
month. The new President is firmly committed to an anti-inflation program,
for the drop in dollar buying power led housewives and industrial workers to
support him at the polls. Maoreover, the country cannot easily afford the tax
increases or larger armament and foreign aid appropriations that price inflation
would require. The new Administration's approach and emphasis, of course,
may vary from past efforts, and its program may totally exclude direct price
controls. But the Administration may well discover that in aligning govern-
mental forces affecting the status of the dollar, direct controls are a necessary
adjunct to credit restrictions, taxes, and wage controls. And in any attempt
to structure direct price controls, the Administration-and the Congress as well
-will have to look to the past two years of price stabilization experience. An
important part of that experience has been the history of interaction between
Congress and the Office of Price Stabilization and the results of this interaction
on the campaign against inflation. It is in this setting that the following pages
bear on the national interest.
PRELUDE TO REGULATION
In September, 1950, a few months after the communist aggression in Korea,
Congress enacted the Defense Production Act providing broad powers for
the imposition of production, allocation, credit, price, and wage controls.
It was the first time in the nation's history that such economic controls were
tAssociate Chief Counsel, Office of Price Stabilization. This article could never have
been written without close association, over the past two years, with Herbert N. Maletz,
Chief Counsel of the Office of Price Stabilization, to whom the writer is greatly indebted.
However, the interpretation of events contained in these pages is purely personal, and is
not to be considered as the official views of either the Office of Price Stabilization or
its Chief Counsel.
1. 64 STAT. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 (Supp. 1952).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
authorized in a period short of all-out war. This phenomenon resulted from
a complex of circumstances, of which at least two were directly responsible
for price controls. Most important was congressional recognition of the in-
flation, largely attributable to a wave of scare buying that had already caused
the nation to feel the impact of rapidly pyramiding living costs. "Politics"
was also a factor. With a national election but two months away, a vote for
Administration emergency powers served to demonstrate to the electorate
that Congress had done its job. And there may have been some Congress-
men who felt, somewhat hopefully, that the task of administering controls
might react against the Administration as it unquestionably had in the 1946
mid-term election.
2
The relative effectiveness of World War II price controls in holding the
line 3 created an expectation that similar results would follow almost im-
mediately upon enactment of the Defense Production Act. But this was not
the case. Although the President promptly established an organizational
framework for imposition of direct controls, 4 both the staffing of the new
organization and creation of a program progressed slowly. In the context
of the Administration's position during the debates on the legislation, this
should not have been surprising. The President had vigorously opposed the
so-called "Baruch Plan" for an immediate freeze of prices and wages.6 And
initially, he did not seek legislative authority for direct controls. Moreover,
2. In June, 1946, Congress passed price control legislation which President Truman
promptly vetoed. After a hiatus in legislative authority and controls, Congress passed,
and the President signed, the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, providing for the
continued decontrol of significant commodities and their recontrol based upon findings
of a new statutory body, the Price Decontrol Board. 60 STAT. 664 (1946). During this
period prices moved up swiftly; and, in spite of the Board's order permitting the recon-
trol of certain of these commodities, the President ordered the termination of all controls
in October 1946. See 19 and 20 QUARTERLY REPORTS OF THE OmcE oF PRIc ADMINIS-
TRATION (1947). For the first time since the 1928 elections, the Republicans won control
of both houses of Congress.
3. See MANSFIELD, A SHORT HISTORY OF OPA (HISTORICAL RzrorTs ON WAR AD-
mINISTRATION: OPA) (Gen. Pub. No. 15, 1947); and HARus & RITz, PROBEIxS IN PIucE
CONTROL: STABILIZATION SUBSIDIES (HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION:
OPA) (Gen. Pub. No. 10, 1947).
4. By executive order the President delegated the stabilization authority in the Act
to the Administrator of the Economic Stabilization Agency. Exec. Order No. 10161, 15
FED. PEG. 6105 (1950).
5. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee's reaction to the Baruch position
was reflected in the report recommending the Defense Production Act, SEN. REP. No.
2250, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950) ; see also 96 CONG. REC. 11609 (1950). Mr. Baruch
had argued a similar proposal prior to the enactment of the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942. See Hearings before House Committee on Banking and Currency on, HS.
5479, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 989-1045 (1941). This issue is discussed in Field, Economic
Stabilization under the Defense Production Act, 64 HAiuv. L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1950). See also




immediate use of direct controls was precluded by a provision of the Act
requiring that a test of "voluntary methods" should precede resort to man-
datory controls," although the statute did not specify how long the test should
run.
Although the Administration's failure to impose mandatory direct price con-
trols at an early date courted disaster,7 the reasons for the hesitation were under-
standable. Basic to the Administration's cautious attitude was the difficulty of
giving affirmative answers to two important questions. Were stabilization con-
trols really necessary? Scare buying had produced the early price advances, and
prices had now leveled off. If controls were to be imposed shortly after enact-
ment of the Defense Production Act, opponents of the Administration were
certain to complain of "controls for control's sake." Secondly, were the people
ready for direct controls? The great majority of the population would not be
disturbed by regulations involving allocation, production, and credit (at least in
1950 when savings were substantial) ; but price and wage controls were differ-
ent. True, the country had promptly accepted price control when the Emergency
Price Control Act was passed in January, 1942. In September and October
of 1950, on the other hand, it was difficult to convince many people that
the Korean attack of June, 1950, was another Pearl Harbor. If the great
mass of the population rebelled against controls, this might preclude their
effective use at a later and more crucial date.
By December, 1950, after the significance of Chinese intervention in the
Korean struggle had become clear, these questions became easier to answer.
The United Nations had suffered a serious reverse from which it might take
many months to rebound. A vast mobilization effort appeared necessary, not
only to assure victory in Korea but to deter Communist aggression elsewhere.
It was recognized that broad economic measures were necessary to with-
stand inflationary pressures resulting from mobilization, and that these mea-
sures would be supported by the American people.
THE BEGINNINGS OF REGLTLATION
The first stop-gap measure was a set of voluntary pricing standards, issued
December 19, 1950, under which manufacturers and distributors were asked
generally to refrain from price advances, to limit price increases to those
compensating for higher costs, and to give the government seven days' notice
6. Sections 402(a), (b), 64 STAT. S03 (1950), 50 U.S.C. Arp. § 2102(a), (b) (Supp.
1952). At the request of Senator Capehart, Price Director Arnall made available to Con-
gress the Administration's legal analysis of this provision (as prepared in 1950), to-
gether with a summary of its legislative history. See Hcarings before Senate Corm.ittee
on Banking and Currency on S. 2594 and S. 2645, 2-d Cong., 2d Sess. 1274-81 (1952).
7. Senators Mlaybank and Capehart have vigorously criticized the Administration
for the failure to impose mandatory controls at an early date. See, e.g., 97 Co:G. Rrx.
7033-4 (1951), 98 Cong. Rec. 6307, 6334-6 (lay 29, 1952). See also Hearings, supra note
6, at 1260-8.
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of any price increases." Accompanying the announcement of the voluntary
program came the threat of mandatory controls if the voluntary standards
for combatting prices rises were not followed. With the Administration's
assurance that no one who followed these standards would be prejudiced in
subsequent price action, the program unquestionably softened rises in some
segments of the economy.
But a great many sellers did not believe the Government would or could
make good on its assurance, and others were simply disinclined to hold the
line. Thus numerous price rises were taken, usually without informing the
government. In one case the automobile manufacturers gave notice that wage
increases compelled an advance in their prices. Failing to prevent by per-
suasion what it regarded as an unjustified increase, the Economic Stabilization
Agency (ESA) issued the first mandatory price and wage regulations-
Ceiling Price Regulation 1 and Wage Stabilization Regulation 1-which
were applicable to manufacturers' sales of new automobiles and wages paid
in their factories. 9 Moreover, the auto producers' attitude and related ex-
periences strengthened the hand of Administration members who desired a
program of general mandatory controls. Alan Valentine, the Economic Sta-
bilization Administrator, who had been reluctant to impose general controls,
was replaced by Eric Johnston, who was convinced that half measures were
ineffectual and overall controls essential. Michael V. DiSalle, Director of
Price Stabilization, who had argued strenuously for general controls, was
instructed to staff the Office of Price Stabilization as quickly as possible and
to issue regulations necessary to halt rising prices.10
The general freeze. The drafting of regulations began in earnest. Specific
regulations were framed for certain crucial items, including hides, fats and
oils, wholesale and retail food, scrap metals, and tallow and soap. But OPS
attention centered on the General Ceiling Price Regulation (the GCPR or
"general freeze"), issued January 26, 1951.11 This regulation "froze" prices at
the highest prices charged by individual sellers during the period between De-
cember 19, 1950, and January 25, 1951. As the administration of GCPR was
soon to demonstrate, selection of the then current base period was most
unfortunate, if not one of the most serious mistakes in the entire price-
control program. In that base period, not only were prices at the highest
level in national history but price relationships were badly out of balance;
numerous sellers had increased their prices far out of proportion to cost
increases, whereas other sellers had held the line even though their costs had
soared. Thus the GCPR resulted in undermining the earlier assurance that
8. 15 Fm). REG. 9255 (1950).
9. 15 Fm. REG. 9061 (1950).
10. The authority to issue ceiling price regulations was at this time re-delegated to
the Director of the Office of Price Stabilization. ESA General Order No. 2, 16 Fzn.
REG. 738 (1951).
11. 16 FED. REG. 808 (1951).
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those who had cooperated in the voluntary program would not suffer for it.
it is safe to conclude that had the freeze rolled back prices to a representa-
tive pre-Korea period, many difficulties that later arose to plague OPS would
never have come to pass.
To remedy the disturbed price relationships resulting from the general
freeze and to make progress in the reduction of prices for meat and indus-
trial materials, OPS began the formulation of specific regulations for manu-
facturers, distributors, and the meat industry. These will be referred to sub-
sequently. But before these regulations were to become fully effective, Con-
gress was to take a hand in constructing the regulatory program. At this
point it is appropriate to refer, in general terms, to the process of price
control legislation.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Factors Responsible for Amendments
Between December, 1950, and June 30, 1951, OPS issued a total of S9
different regulations.' 2 These were supplemented by numerous official inter-
pretations, mostly in connection with the general freeze, and by a huge number
of responses to inquiries about regulations.1 3 It was something of a phenom-
enon that this much could be accomplished in so short a time by such a
limited staff. But volume production has always characterized price control
experience.'-
This volume alone is certain to evoke some kind of response from the
Congress. Reasonable men in Congress often assume that private industry's
objections to particular regulations must have some merit: how could or-
dinary human beings fail to make mistakes when regulations are formulated
and issued so rapidly? Thus whenever industry objections lead Congress to
make detailed amendments, the general assumption is that the product of the
thinking and compromising of 531 men elected by the people must necessarily
12. REP. OF THE RECORDING SEC'Y, OPS (Aug. 1951 and Aug. 1952); RnronT or
FEm OPERATIo.s DIvisION, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, OPS (Oct. 1952).
13. Including the regulations issued prior to June, 1951, the National Office of OPS
had issued, up to June 30, 1952, a total of 11,391 regulations of various kinds; by Au,ust
31, 1952, the National Office had completed action on 10,009 price actions, including
approval of adjusted ceilings self-determined under Capehart Amendment regulations;
up to September 30, 1952, OPS field offices had completed work on 44,56t3 additional
price actions; between January, 1951, and September 30, 1952, national and field offices
had issued a total of 52,423 written interpretations; and it was estimated that OPS offices
had given 247,859 "oral explanations" of regulations in the fiscal year July 1, 1951, to
June 30, 1952.
14. In 1941-2, even prior to the enactment of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, some 105 non-mandatory price regulations had been issued. 1 QuAnTIX" Rtuo.rr
OF THE OPA 23 (1942). According to an unofficial estimate of the National Archives,
OPA issued 93,500 regulations of various kinds.
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be better for both the industry affected and the national economy than the
regulation which it has modified.
Yet it would be impossible for all 531 members to share fully in the legis-
lative decision. The volume of regulations, combined with the broad area of
their coverage, means that Congressmen will often be unable to base their
own judgments upon all the facts; they will be required to choose between
the agency judgment with respect to the purposes and techniques of a regu-
lation and a congressional committee's judgment based upon the objections
of the affected industry. Congress can seldom postpone and ponder this
decision, which must be made in connection with the yearly extension of
price control authority.
Even if price control were to be administered through a very few regula-
tions, it is doubtful that the legislative process would be much different.
Whether numerous or not, any regulations affecting small as well as large
sellers and governing sales at every stage of production and distribution will
attract at least as much fire as the federal income tax laws. Moreover, the
administration of price control contains legislative risks not to be found in
the administration of the revenue acts. The concept of net income and the
itemization of deductions can be standardized for tax purposes, but in price
control every industry, sometimes every geographical area, and occasionally
each manufacturer and distributor, must be considered and provided for in-
dependently. Under these circumstances objections to the regulatory program
are a certainty, no matter how expert the staff and how thorough the formula-
tion. But when the agency is both undermanned and rushed, complaints
multiply, for mistakes and imagined mistakes will be commonplace. The
really surprising thing is that error is far from the rule.
Effective executive activity in the legislative process can come only while
Congress deliberates, not later. Citizens usually bring their grievances about
the price control program to Congress at the most propitious time: when the
committees of the Congress are considering the annual extension of price
control legislation. If an objection to the program is sufficiently persuasive,
either on its merits or perhaps because of its political appeal, it will result
in a rider-amendment to the new legislation. And, as with appropriation acts,
the threat of veto is of little significance. Congress is aware that the President,
mindful of the 1946 hiatus in controls and the resulting price inflation, will
not veto price control legislation and thus interrupt controls in order to
nullify an objectionable rider. Hence, the veto power plays but a small part
in the legislative process.
Volume of Amendments
Considering these factors, the number of important statutory amendments
adopted in 1951 and 195215 is not astonishing. In 1951 some 39 amend-
15. 1951 amendments: 65 STAT. 131 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. §2061 (Supp. 1952) ; 1952
amendments: Pub. L. No. 429, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 30, 1952).
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ments were added to the Defense Production Act, of which 19 were directed
at the OPS price and meat allocation programs. In 1952 some 33 additional
amendments finally became part of the Act, 20 of which related to OPS ad-
ministration.
The number of amendments actually adopted, however, represents only a
small fraction of the total number of amendments actually introduced in 1951
and 1952 during various stages of the legislative program. In 1951 a total of
217 amendments were offered, of which some 104 dealt with the price control
and meat allocation programs. In the 1952 session a total of 167 bills and
amendments were offered, of which some 57 related to OPS-administered
programs.
A breakdown of these data shows that legislative pressure to alter the ad-
ministrative process is largely of a "bipartisan" nature. Ninety-six of the
1951 amendments were offered by Republicans and 121 by Democrats, while
in 1952 the principal sponsors of 84 amendments were Republicans, with 83
coming from the Democratic side. The total for both years combined, cover-
ing both houses: 180 amendments sponsored principally by Republicans, and
204 by Democrats.
THE M'NANUFACTURERS' REGULATIONS AND THE CAPEHART AMENDIENT
The Basic Pricing Standards
In framing regulations, OPS was required to measure its ceilings against
the basic pricing standards set forth in Title IV of the Defense Production
Act.', The Act directs that ceilings shall be "generally fair and equitable."
This same legislative pricing standard appeared in the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942. Since both OPA and OPS issued general freeze regu-
lations containing later base periods than those set forth in the 1942 and 1950
Acts, thus setting prices at more generous levels than the statutes required,
there was little question that freeze regulations and the tailored regulations
based on them would be "generally fair and equitable" for some time to come.
In the case of OPS, this conclusion would be particularly compelling because
only two tailored regulations preceded the freeze, compared to some 105 issued
prior to OPA's general freeze.
The 1950 Act (like the 1942 Act) did not permit the Agency to rest on
ceilings originally established, but required that regulations continue to meet
the "generally fair and equitable" standard as the cost of labor, materials,
and doing business increased. This was reenforced by the requirement of
Section 402(c) that in determining and adjusting ceilings, OPS must con-
sider "[s]peculative fluctuations, general increases or decreases in cost of pro-
duction, distribution, and transportation, and general increases or decreases
16. For discussions of these legislative standards, see Field, Econon c Stabilization
under the Defense Production Act, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1950) ; and Durham, The Pres-
ent Status of Price Control Authority, 52 CO. L. REv. S63 (1952).
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in profits earned.., subsequent to June 24, 1950." These very general words
required detailed elaboration, both to provide fair and rational administration
of the. Act and to further the Act's anti-inflationary objective by providing
a test under which some cost increases would be absorbed by the seller.
In formulating its standards, OPS looked for guidance to the policies of
OPA, which had operated under identical legislative standards and had faced
the same problem of cost absorption. In brief, the meaning given "generally
fair and equitable" by OPA was that a manufacturer's ceiling price renained
valid, in spite of increased costs of production, so long as (1) his industry's
earnings equalled those experienced in 1936-39, and (2) his industry was
not producing an individual product at an "out-of-pocket" loss. These
came to be known as the "Industry Earnings" and "Product" standards.
These standards had been thoroughly scrutinized by Congress and the courts,
and had survived."
In early 1951 a task force within OPS began the formulation of equivalent
"Industry Earnings" and "Product" standards. The initial statement of the
"Industry Earnings" standard appeared in a directive from Economic Stabilizer
Eric Johnston to Price Director DiSalle:
"The level of price ceilings for an industry shall normally be
considered 'generally fair and equitable' under the Defense Pro-
duction Act if the dollar profits of the industry amount to 85 per
cent of the average for the industry's best three years during the
period 1946 to 1949, inclusive. The profits should be figured before
Federal income and excess profits taxes and after normal deprecia-
tion only, with adjustments made for any changes in net worth.,"1 a
This administrative construction of the Act was repeatedly stated by Charles
E. Wilson, Eric Johnston, and Michael V. DiSalle in the hearings on the
1951 amendments.1 ' Price Director Ellis Arnall later announced more detailed
statements of these standards,19 which applied to all areas of price control
but were particularly important in framing regulations setting manufacturers'
ceilings.
17. The most exhaustive descriptions of these administrative standards appear in a
pamphlet, OPA, GENERAL STANDARDS FOR SEMTING MAXIM UM PIuCzS (1946), and in
CAvERs & ASSOCIATES, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: PRICING STANDARDS (HISTORICAL
REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION: OPA) (Gen. Pub. No. 7, 1947). See also Armour
& Co. v. Bowles, 148 F.2d 529 (Em. Ct. App. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 871 (1945);
Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co. v. Bowles, 144 F.2d 361 (Em. Ct. App. 1944).
17a. 1 BuREAu OF NATIONAl, AFFAIRS, FEDERAL CONTROLS, 305 Price, 91:1 (April 21,
1951).
18. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1397, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 21-2, 521, 561, 564, 594-7, 632, 1555, 1802, 2211, 2778 (1951). See also
Hearings before House Conmmittee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 3871, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1116-7, 1256-7, 1466, 1748, 1981 (1951) ; 97 Cong. Rec. 7223 (June 25, 1952);
id. at 7683 (June 29, 1952).




Immediately after the imposition of the general freeze, OPS began issuing
special regulations for manufacturers. These regulations, starting with the
General Manufacturers' Regulation (CPR 22),20 were extended to include
machinery, machine tools, farm machinery and other related industries (CPR
30),21 woolen yams and fabrics (CPR iS), 2 cotton textiles (CPR 37),
men's and women's apparel (CPR 45),2-4 and shoes (CPR 41).23 Under
these regulations individual manufacturers would calculate their own ceiling
prices by adding to their pre-Korea prices the increased direct labor and
material costs since Korea and up to prescribed cut-off dates. These regu-
lations would allow advances over the "'general freeze" ceiling where prices
had not kept pace with cost increases, while rolling back those prices which
were raised beyond cost increases. The Agency estimated that five billion
dollars a year would be saved for consumers and military services by virtue
of these industrial rollbacks.2 The pricing method also had the advantage
of not penalizing those who cooperated in the Government's voluntary pro-
gram, and of not favoring those who had ignored the program. At the time
of congressional consideration of the 1951 amendments, the manufacturers
regulation had been issued but had not become effective on a compulsory basis.
However, manufacturers were permitted an option of pricing under these
regulations prior to the compulsory effective date. In addition, beef rollbae&s
approximating $700,000,000 were scheduled for August 1 and October 1 ;1
although better publicized, these were not nearly so important as the manu-
facturers' rollbackg.
The Anti-Rollback Provisions
Their genesis. For opponents of price control, the most effective strategy
was to persuade Congress to prohibit any rollbacks. Such a prohibition would
necessitate substantial additional price increases for those commodities which
had not kept pace with the general increase; a balanced price structure could
be achieved only at the level of prices which had risen the most.
Opponents of the program used an argument always effective with Con-
gress and with the public, that rollbacks coming so late after the imposition
20. 16 FED. REG. 10535, 11809 (1951).
21. 16 FED. REG. 12050 (1951).
22. 16 FED. REG. 3039 (1951).
23. 16 FED. REG. 4644 (1951).
24. 16 FED. REG. 9230 (1951).
25. 16 FED. Rr_. 5044 (1951).
26. 97 Cong. Rec. 7213-5 (June 25, 1951).
27. See statement of Congressman Cooley, Chairman, House Committee on Agri-
culture, in Hearings before Hou.se Conmdttce on Ban~ng anrd Currency on H.R. 3871, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2144, 2148 (1951), criticizing these rollbacks; see also OPS Memoran-
dum on Beef Price Control Program, id. at 1280-92, defending the announced beef roll-
backs.
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of the general freeze would hamper production and thus increase inflationary
pressures. Another assertion was that rollbacks, by reducing excess profits,
would reduce tax collections. When passions ran high, this assertion shifted
into the claim that rollbacks embodied "profit control." Some industry wit-
nesses before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee advocated not
only a ban on rollbacks, but also a mandatory requirement that ceilings must
be increased to reflect increases in wages and raw materials. The principal
proponent, George Terborgh of the Machinery and Allied Products Institute,
summarized this proposal in these words:
"(1) Require OPS in establishing ceiling prices on capital goods
(and on accessories, attachments, and specialized components there-
of) to relate the ceilings to prices in effect during the base period
of the general ceiling price regulation.
"(2) Provide that approved increases in wage rates and salaries
and increases in the ceiling prices of suppliers occurring after the
close of the base period can be automatically 'passed through' as
adjustments of the initial ceiling prices.
281
Disagreement among Senate Committee members. The Senate Committee
did not embrace this double-barreled relief proposal.20 However, the Com-
mittee, voting 7-6, recommended a new subsection to Section 402(d) of the
Act, which would prohibit ceilings below the lower of
"(A) the price prevailing just before the date of the issuance of the
regulation . . . or
"(B) 90% of the price prevailing during the period January 20, 1951,
to February 24, 1951, inclusive."
The effect of paragraph (A) was to prevent the rollbacks in the manufac-
turers regulation from becoming effective and of paragraph (B), to prevent
any additional rollbacks on livestock and beef. The Committee argued for
this proposal in these terms:
"The Government has had, since the general price freeze in
January 1951, 5 months to roll back any prices which were seriously
out of line. Producers should not be required or expected to go on
indefinitely not knowing whether their prices will be rolled back
to a pre-Korea level.
"Since anything which hampers production has an inflationary
tendency, your committee came to the conclusion that it would con-
tribute to the stabilization program to impose limitations on the
authority to roll prices back.
"At the same time, your committee was of the opinion that the
roll-backs which had already taken effect could not reasonably be
28. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1397, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2309 (1951).
29. SEN. RE'. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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considered a hardship on producers, or a threat to production. Con-
sequently, the decision was made not to recommend cancellation of
roll-backs taking effect before the enactment of the amendment."30
The base periods contained in this proposal did not expressly supersede
the May 24-June 24, 1950, pre-Korean base period contained in Sections
402(b) and 402(c) of the 1950 Act. Yet it was not possible to deny that the
Act set up a new standard for the manufacturers regulations and for beef.
Moreover, it was quite clear that it would be administratively impossible to
use different base periods for other areas of the economy; ceilings for many
commodities necessarily must be set with reference to ceilings in other areas,
lest the productive balance be impaired. The Committee apparently was aware
that its proposal would demand a single base period, and it admonished the
Agency to "hold the line" at the new base period. The report read:
"... While your committee realizes that to fix in the law a price
freeze on the date of January 24 would be impractical, and in very
rare instances perhaps unworkable, it urges that the Price Adminis-
trator hereafter in fixing any maximum ceiling not fix a maximum
ceiling at a higher price than the minimum price existing for the
commodity in the period January 24-February 24. This will once
and for all stop any further price increase based on other price in-
creases that were in turn based on other price increases." 3'
At this stage of legislative consideration many committee members believed
that prices could be stabilized at the level prevailing in January and February,
1951. This conclusion, however, was possible only in theory: some producers'
prices exceeded this general level, and since rollbacks were to be forbidden,
equality of ceilings could come only through raising all ceilings to the highest
prices.
Six of the thirteen Committee members, including Senator Ives, took
issue with the majority. -3 2 The five Democratic dissenters adopted most of
the arguments which had been made by Economic Stabilizer Johnston and
Price Director DiSalle-and added some others. They asserted that proper
ceiling price relationships could not be based upon the new base period of
January-February, 1951, because of distorted price relationships and abnor-
mally high price levels then prevailing. They raised serious interpretive ques-
tions about the anti-rollback amendment and argued that farmers and indus-
trialists need not anticipate a rollback to May-June, 1950:
30. Id. at 16-17.
31. Id. at 18.
32. These dissents took the form of "Additional Views of Senators Fulbright, Sparl:-
man, Douglas, Benton, and Moody on the Anti-Rollback Amendment," and the substan-
tially similar "Individual Views of U. S. Senator Irving M. Ives." Smi. Ra. No. 470,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-34, 38-40 (1951). In addition, Senators Douglas, Benton, and
Moody filed a "Supplementary Statement" urging that the Act be strengthened in partic-
ular respects. Id. at 35-7.
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"It must be admitted that to say that the Price Administrator has
the authority to roll prices back to June 1950 gives the appearance
of a drastic power in the hands of Mr. DiSalle. We believe that this
is not a fair phrasing of the present provisions of the law, which re-
quire that he 'give due consideration to' the prices prevailing in the
pre-Korea period. To roll prices back completely, without giving
any consideration to cost increase since that date would, we believe,
violate the requirement that all price regulations be generally fair
and equitable."
And the five Democratic Senators added seven more objections to the anti-
rollback proposal:
"It would mean a general price increase to the level of the highest
prices .... It would mean an upward revision of the wage stabiliza-
tion formula. . . . It would not necessarily prohibit, but might
authorize severe farm roll-backs: ... [I]f a sudden glut of the beef
market broke the average price of beef to $25 a hundredweight, OPS
could step in with a $25 ceiling. . . . It would invalidate all manu-
facturers' price regulations as well as all reporting work and ex-
penses of over 75,000 manufacturers. . . . It would generally pre-
clude passing on to consumers the advantages of drops in raw-
material costs. . . .Large price increases would have to be granted
those concerns 'caught short' by the general price freeze. . . . It
might prevent the lowering of import prices.... 
Senate debate. This basic disagreement continued through the Senate
debates. Chairman Maybank of the Banking and Currency Committee ex-
pained the anti-rollback provision:
"We have amended this new bill to make the January 25th freeze
an equitable one. There may be no future roll-backs beyond this
date in justice to the manufacturers and producers who cannot be
expected to plan future operations under such uncertainties as those
in which they are now living."33
Senator Douglas led the opposition to the Committee proposal. He repeated-
ly pointed out that its principal effect would be the cancellation of the an-
nounced rollbacks on manufactured goods, and he attempted to persuade
Senators from farm states to reject this aspect of the proposal. He argued:
"The amendment which the committee wrote into the bill has
sometimes been referred to as the 'beef amendment.' The purpose
of the amendment is said to be to protect beef from an additional
9-percent reduction....
"Mr. President, I think the term 'beef,' in regard to the insertion
of section 2, is a misnomer. I would call it the Trojan steer amend-
ment .... [laughter]
"As I have said, the roll-back in the case of building materials
would amount to $1,000,000,000 net; in the case of chemicals,
33. 97 Cong. Rec. 7200 (June 25, 1951).
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$3,000,000,000; cutting tools, $25,000,000; electrical equipment,
$55,000,000; and the possible roll-back in the case of rubber, $150,-
000,000."':1
As a possible compromise, he hoped to limit the effect of the rollback amend-
ment to beef:
"[W]e can make an individual adjustment in the case of beef
itself. That can be considered by means of separate amendment
which can be supplied to the base period, so that if any particular
hardships are suffered by the producers of beef, that situation can
be taken into account....
"However, I urge my good friends who come from the beef-
producing States not to let themselves be used, in effect, as cat's
paws to rake the chestnuts out of the fire for the big manufacturers
and monopolists who have enjoyed speculative gains since the attack
on Korea."
3
Senator O'Mahoney followed suit by introducing an amendment which
would have exempted only cattle and sheep from future rollbacks.2c Senator
Wherry of Nebraska countered by proposing a complete prohibition on any
ceiling reduction. This would have prevented all rollbacks on manufactured
goods, and it might even have cancelled the 10-per cent beef rollback which
had already gone into effect. The Wherry substitute was defeated, 49 to 39. T
Thereafter the O'Mahoney substitute for the Committee amendment was
defeated, 63 to 25; Senators from livestock states made up most of the
minority.38 Miany Senators who wished to strike out the Committee proposal
in its entirety voted against the O'Mahoney substitute hoping that the Com-
mittee proposal would be easier to beat than the O'Mahoney amendment.
This strategy backfired, when the Committee amendment was approved, 61
to 26, with several of the supporters of the O'Mahoney substitute voting
"Aye."'39 The Senate then rejected Senator Moody's amendment authorizing
the announced rollbacks in the manufacturers regulation, as well as the second
beef rollback.4 6
Sen-ate attempt to modify the anti-rollback amendment. At this point
Senator MKillikin introduced another amendment adding a new sentence to
the Senate Banking Committee amendment: .
"Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the establishment or
maintenance of a ceiling price with respect to any material (other
than an agricultural commodity) which is based upon a period prior
34. Id. at 7213-5.
35. Ibid.
36. 97 Cong. Rec. 7430 (June 27, 1951).
37. Id. at 7433-5.
38. Id. at 7440.
39. Id. at 7443.
40. Id. at 7448.
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to January 25, 1951, if such ceiling price reflects adjustments for in-
creases or decreases in actual factory and labor costs, including
reasonable allowances for other costs occurring subsequent to such
period."
4'
Theoretically permitting rollbacks, the language of the Millikin amendment
faintly resembled the general formula of the manufacturers regulations by
envisaging ceilings based on a pre-Korea period with "adjustments for in-
creases or decreases in actual factory and labor costs." But the amendment
also required ceilings to reflect "reasonable allowances for other costs"-
unlike the manufacturers regulation which recognized only direct cost in-
creases. This recognition of all costs made Millikin's resemblance to the OPS
formula quite illusory. Moreover, the manufacturers regulation had pre-
scribed specific cut-off dates beyond which ceiling prices could not reflect
cost increases. But the Millikin amendment, requiring continual ceiling ad-
justment to reflect cost increases regardless of their timing, would permit a
continuous escalation of prices.
Presumably because the Millikin amendment theoretically softened the
more rigid anti-rollback limitation adopted by the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, it was approved by voice vote.42 However, the Millikin amendment
never became law. Its House version, the Wolcott amendment, was defeated.
40
What is most important now about the Millikin amendment is that with
some modification it became enshrined in the second sentence of the so-called
Capehart amendment.
The Cooley Amendment
On June 28, 1951, the Senate passed a bill extending the price control
authority,44 but the House was still considering this legislation. It was ap-
parent, however, that the House bill would vary substantially from the Senate
version, particularly with respect to the anti-rollback provision. Even were
the House to pass a bill immediately, only two days would remain before
the Act's expiration in which to hold a conference, reach agreement, and
secure approval by both houses. In this context Chairman Spence of the
House Banking and Currency Committee feared that disagreement at con-
ference would bring about a hiatus in controls. Thus he persuaded the House
to extend the 1950 Act for one month. A rider offered by Congressman
Cooley prohibited rollbacks of any kind from becoming effective during July
1951 ;45 this rider aimed to maintain the status quo until the Conference
41. Id. at 7436.
42. 97 Cong. Rec. 7551 (June 28, 1951). An attempt by Senator Morse to strike out
the Millikin exemption for agricultural commodities was first rejected. Id. at 7549.
43. 97 Cong. Rec. 8501 (July 17, 1951) ; id. at A4664 (July 18, 1951).
44. 97 Cong. Rec. 8811 (July 20, 1951).
45. 97 Cong. Rec. 7678 (June 29, 1951).
[Vol. 62:1
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Committee could work out a bill acceptable to both Houses. The Senate had
no alternative but to accept the one month extension.:A0
To preserve the status quo under the Cooley amendment, OPS on June
30, 1951, issued General Overriding Regulation 13,y providing that manu-
facturers who had elected to price under the manufacturers regulations would
continue to do so. All other manufacturers were required to remain under
the general freeze order. GOR 13 was revoked one month later s and new
compulsory effective dates for the manufacturing regulations were scheduled 9
But before these regulations could take effect, their effective dates were again
postponed indefinitely10 to await regulations implenenting the Capehart
amendment.
The Cooley amendment unquestionably had costly consequences. It per-
mitted a comprehensive rollback prohibition to become embedded in the
statute and in the thinking of the Congress. It had been assumed that haste
would cause enactment of the most inflationary of the anti-rollback possi-
bilities, and that time would permit the interested public to insist on the least
inflationary provision. But by this time the issues had become so complex,
and the course of legislation so involved, that the consuming public was either
bewildered or apathetic. A lull in the forward advance of the price level con-
tributed to the disinterest of consumer groups and the general public. The
industrial groups, however, did not hesitate to press their advantage.
The Capehart Amendment: Individual Ceiling Adjustment
Out of the deliberations of the Senate-House conferees in the summer
of 1951 came the so-called Capehart amendment, which was promptly ac-
cepted by both Houses as Section 402(d) (4) of the amended Act.z ' This
amendment consisted of four sentences3 ' The first was based on the com-
46. 65 STAT. 110 (1951).
47. 16 FED. REG. 6435 (1951).
48. 16 FED. REG. 7546 (1951).
49. 16 FED. REG. 7590 (1951).
50. 16 FED. REG. 7931 (1951) ; id. at 9655; id. at 11482.
51. Senate, 97 Cong. Rec. 9230-4 (July 27, 1951); House, 97 Cong. Rec. 9357-67
(July 30, 1951).
52. "After the enactment of this paragraph no ceiling price on any material (other
than an agricultural commodity) or on any service shall become effective which is below
the lower of (A) the price prevailing just before the date of issuance of the regulation
or order establishing such ceiling price, or (B) the price prevailing during the period
January 25, 1951, to February 24, 1951, inclusive. Nothing in this paragraph shall pro-
hibit the establishment or maintenance of a ceiling price with respect to any material
(other than an agricultural commodity) or service which (1) is based upon the highest
price between January 1, 1950, and June 24, 1950, inclusive, if such ceiling price reflects
adjustments for increases or decreases in costs occurring subsequent to the date on which
such highest price was received and prior to July 26, 1951, or (2) is established under
a regulation issued prior to the enactment of this paragraph. Upon application and a
proper showing of his prices and costs by any person subject to a ceiling price, the
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prehensive anti-rollback provision sponsored by seven of the thirteen members
of the Senate Banking Committee, except that the rollback ban was limited
to non-agricultural commodities. The second sentence was based, with two
important modifications, on the Millikin-Wolcott amendment which had been
passed by the Senate but rejected by the House. The first modification
allowed rollbacks to go into effect if established under regulations issued
prior to July 31, 1951. This meant that the manufacturers' regulations which
had been issued considerably before that time could go into effect according
to their terms. The second modification prescribed a July 26, 1951, cut-off
date for recognition of cost increases in place of the continuous escalation
required by the Millikin amendment. The fourth sentence defined costs, for
the purposes of the amendment, as all costs, except those found unreasonable
or excessive.
In sum, the first, second, and fourth sentences taken together prohibit
issuance of new regulations reducing ceiling prices of non-agricultural com-
modities below prescribed levels. Prices under such regulations may not be
set below the lowest of (a) the price prevailing just before the date of issu-
ance of the regulation or order establishing such ceiling price; (b) the price
prevailing during the period January 25, 1951, to February 24, 1951, in-
clusive; or (c) the highest price between January 1, 1950, and June 24, 1950,
inclusive, adjusted for increases or decreases in all subsequent costs with a
July 26, 1951, cut-off.
These provisions had earlier received extensive discussion. It was Cape-
hart's third sentence which made news. That started from the entirely new
premise that every manufacturer or processor was entitled to an individual
adjustment in his ceiling prices to reflect the highest pre-Korea price adjusted
for cost increases up to July 26, 1951. The third sentence reads:
"Upon application and a proper showing of his prices and
costs by any person subject to a ceiling price, the President shall
adjust such ceiling price in the manner prescribed in clause (1)
of the preceding [second] sentence. .. "
Explaining the amendment, the Conference Committee stated:
"This roll-back amendment will permit the Administration to roll
back the price of all gougers to a fair and reasonable level but will
protect the fair and reasonable profit of those who have merely
added to their pre-war prices the necessary and unavoidable costs
of doing business which they have since incurred."58
President shall adjust such ceiling price in the manner prescribed in clause (1) of the
preceding sentence. For the purposes of this paragraph the term 'cost' includes material,
indirect and direct labor, factory, selling, advertising, office, and all other production,
distribution, transportation and administration costs, except such as the President may
determine to be unreasonable and excessive." § 402(d) (4), 66 STAT. 298, 50 U.S.C. Ap'.
§2102(d) (4) (Supp. 1952).
53. H.R. RFl. No. 770, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1951).
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Somewhat unfairly to the senator from Indiana, it was the third sentence of
Section 402(d) (4), quoted above-for which Senator Capehart was said to
have been primarily responsible 54-that led to the identification of the entire
subsection with his name. And it was this sentence which was to have
the most drastic effect on the price program. What had happened was that
the original legislative move to limit rollbacks had been used as a springboard
for a more extreme revision: individual adjustments for manufacturers. The
legislative process which developed the third sentence certainly did not repre-
sent Congress at its deliberative best. The sentence was shaped in the early
morning hours without the knowledgeable debate or reception of agency testi-
mony that might have been expected to precede adoption of an amendment
with unprecedented dimensions and staggering economic and administrative
implications.
Admi2istrative answer: attem pted repeal. The individual adjustment pro-
vision, affecting the pricing of millions of manufactured items, placed upon
the agency an administrative task completely beyond the experience of price
control in this country. To carry out the mandate of the third sentence and
still honor the basic anti-inflationary purposes of the Act required delicate
balancing. The most difficult job was allocation of overhead or indirect costs
to a specific product. For example, how should multi-line manufacturer-
allocate expenditures for research, advertising, and office personnel to each
specific product?
Consideration of these administrative problems, together with an estimate
of the possible economic impact of the third sentence of the Capehart amend-
ment, led the Administration to seek immediate repeal of the amendment.
On August 23, 1951, less than a month after the enactment of the legislation,
the President sent a special message to Congress recommending repeal.0 The
President said:
"The amendment will make price control regulations more com-
plicated and endanger the development of dollars-and-cents ceilings
which are so helpful both to business and to the consumer-and so
important to effective enforcement of controls....
"It is also clear that the Capehart amendment will shift more
of the burden of our defense program to the shoulders of those least
able to bear it. All along the line, under the Capehart amendment,
business is protected. Business is told that it need not absorb rising
costs. But no such assurance is extended to the consumer, the wage
earner, and the people living on pensions and other fixed in-
comes....
"The direct price-raising effects of this amendment are by no
means the whole story. Equally serious are the enormous adminis-
trative and accounting burdens which this amendment imposes on
both Government and business."
54. See 97 Cong. Rec. 9233 (July 27, 1951).
55. SrN. Doc. No. 61, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
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Senators Ferguson, Nixon, and Welker promptly introduced a bill which
would have repealed each of the provisions which the President criticized.
Their stated purpose was to give the Administration what it wanted lest
Congress be held responsible for legislating inflation. 0 Senator Maybank in-
troduced a bill eliminating only the third sentence of the Capehart amend-
ment; this later emerged as the Committee bill.
At the Committee hearings, Director DiSalle spoke out against individual
pricing. He argued that this type of control placed a heavy computation and
reporting burden on business; compliance is virtually impossible unless prices
are known to buyers and sellers alike, and uniform pricing for manufacturers
makes allocations and pricing at other levels easier. 7 Conceding that the
General Manufacturers' Regulation and related OPS regulations contained
Capehart's weaknesses, he pointed out that they were intended only as in-
terim devices to relieve the inequities of the general freeze and to roll back
excessive prices. Meanwhile, he explained, OPS was busy grinding out
tailored industry regulations containing uniform ceiling prices that could be
enforced.
DiSalle emphasized the difficuties of cost determination in individual pric-
ing, a serious problem even on an industry basis. He noted seventeen different
methods of overhead cost allocation " and gave an example of the wide dif-
ferences in unit overhead costs which may result from applying disparate
accounting methods. His statistics showed that overhead costs in general use
not only are quite arbitrary but almost invariably overstate the actual cost in
times of high production and demand. And he added:
"The new standard . .. has the power to override all other price
control standards....
"Once individual sellers are given the right to get their cellings
adjusted for all increases in their cost between certain dates, . . .
it will in many instances be impossible to deny the same ceiling
prices to their competitors even though the competitors cannot claim
them individually on the basis of their own costs. .. ."50
The Director also argued that the cost standard of the third sentence
would supersede the basic "generally fair and equitable" requirement of the
Act, because it would prevent "cost absorption" where this practice is nor-
mal:
56. 97 Cong. Rec. 10763-6 (August 23, 1951).
57. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 2092, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2834-61, 2880-4, 2892-7, 2903-10 (1951); Hearings before House Cot-
mittee on Banking and Currency on S. 2170, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2184-94, 2204-17, 2221-
32, 2239-44, 2254-61 (1951).
58. LANG, COST ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 1062-3 (1951).
59. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1928, S.
2092, S. 2104, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1951).
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"Business has practiced 'cost absorption' for years. In fact,
American business has prided itself on its ability to absorb cost
increases, yet maintain or lower its prices. By this technique it
has increased its volume and expanded its markets. During a pros-
perous time like this, when volume is at peak levels and markets
are expanding, it is not unreasonable to abide by this time-proven
principle of sound business procedure."'60
Congressional response. The Senate and House Banking and Currency
Committees were genuinely impressed by this appeal. It is true that the
Senate Committee refused to recommend repeal of the anti-rollback pro-
visions of the Capehart amendment because "it would leave too large an
area of Administration discretion as to the extent of any and all roll-backs
on individual commodities. '61 Yet the Senate Committee did recommend
repeal of the third sentence. Its report noted at some length the accounting
difficulties involved in the computation of overhead costs for a multi-product
firm, and concluded:
"[G]ougers would be tempted to exaggerate their cost increases
on a product basis and the administrative agency might often be
unable to detect such manipulation. The overwhelming majority of
manufacturers, no doubt, would refuse to engage in any such practice.
In protection of their legitimate interests, however, they would in
every case of doubt have to use a somewhat higher rather than lower
figure.... [I]t might lead to higher, and unnecessarily high, price
levels."6
2
The Senate Committee amendment would have given OPS the authority to
determine a reasonable allowance for overhead costs in the administration
of the second sentence of the Capehart provision, and would have made
individual ceiling adjustments mandatory in hardship cases.0
Four of the Republican members of the Committee dissented. 4 Their state-
ment argued that the Committee amendment was inflationary to the ex-tent
that it failed to provide a cut-off date at July 26, 1951, as did the existing
Capehart provision, and that it was also discriminatory because it did not require
a passing on of cost increases up to that date. The proposal to make adjustments
mandatory in hardship cases was termed a negative form of profit control and
was criticized as meaningless, since OPS already was providing hardship relief
in GOR 10. The four minority members, however, failed to secure Senate
approval of a substitute bill continuing the Capehart amendment,c5 and the
Committee bill was adopted 49 to 21.00
60. Ibid.
61. Srx. REP. No. 796, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id. at 9-18. They also proposed an entirely new amendment, discussed id. at 17.
65. 97 Cong. Rec. 12861 (October 4, 1951).
66. Ibid.
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Yet the repeal venture fizzled. The House Committee promptly considered
the bill passed by the Senate and, with one minor variation, recommended
its passage.0 7 But the House Committee on Rules failed to grant the necessary
rule to permit consideration of the bill in the short time remaining during the
first session of the Eighty-second Congress. OPS now had to live with the
Capehart amendment.
The Capehart Regulations
Throughout the entire period of legislative reconsideration, the agency bad
assumed that statutory change might not be forthcoming. Consequently, OPS
officials had planned implementation of Capebart's third sentence, which
would require the greatest number of price increases and which would cause
substantial revision of the regulatory program. Available to OPS were CPR
22 and supplementary regulations, which provided individual adjustments
and were intended to serve only until "tailored" controls could be issued.
These regulations had never been effectuated on a compulsory basis. A task
force working with the Director decided not to scrap the regulations but to
adapt the Capehart formula to them.0 8
Large and Small Manufacturers. On November 9, 1951, OPS issued the
first two of the implementing Capehart regulations. These were Supple-
mentary Regulation 17 to CPR 22,69 which made available to all manufac-
turers governed by CPR 22 the individual pricing formula of the third
sentence of the Capehart Amendment, and SR 4 to CPR 30,70 which accom-
plished the same result for all manufacturers governed by CPR 30. Under
both new regulations, labor and materials cost increases are to be determined
in the same manner as under CPR 22 and CPR 30, except that the cut-off
date for inclusion of cost increases is extended to the statutory date of July
26, 1951. With respect to the difficult problem of overhead, the new regu-
lations contain a formula providing that each individual manufacturer can
adjust for increases in such costs either by (a) reference to his entire busi-
ness or, (b) in the event he allocated overhead to product lines in the past,
using his established cost accounting method. The formula, however, does
exclude certain non-recurring or capital expenditures, consistent with general-
ly accepted accounting practices.
67. The House Committee also emphasized the difficulties of administering the in-
dividual adjustment provision, although it felt the Senate Committee's attempt to restrict
individual relief to persons suffering financial hardship did not go far enough. See H.R.
REP. No. 1186, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 6 (1951).
68. Director DiSalle described these efforts in detail to the Congress. See JOINT
CoiMnuTrE oN DEFENSE PRODUcrOiN, PROGRESS REP. No. 10, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 585-94
(1951).
69. 16FED. REG. 11484 (1951).
70. 16 FED. REG. 11496 (1951).
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The foregoing regulations are applicable to small as well as large manu-
facturers. In addition, OPS issued alternate regulations which small manu-
facturers can employ at their option. These regulations, SR 18 to CPR 22 71
and SR 5 to CPR 30,72 allow manufacturers with net annual sales of less
than one million dollars to determine a ceiling adjustment reflecting increased
labor and material costs to July 26, 1951. Such manufacturers are not required
to compute increases in overhead costs, but can simply adjust the previously-
calculated ceilings determined under CPR 22 or 30. In this event, no credit
will be received for increased overhead costs even though actually incurred.
If the small manufacturer desires to claim a ceiling adjustment based upon
increased overhead, he must follow the longer procedures contained in SR 17
to CPR 22 or SR 4 to CPR 30.
The agency also issued implementing Capehart regulations, GOR 20 73
and 21, 74 for manufacturers not governed by CPR 22 or CPR 30. GOR 20,
characterized as the "small business overriding regulation," attempted to
carry out the statutory mandate for concerns with limited accounting records
and personnel. Under this regulation, concerns with net annual sales of less
than $250,000 determine their total cost increases solely by a comparison of
their costs of doing business for the first halves of 1950 and 1951. In addi-
tion, a seller experiencing a wage increase between January 1, 1951, and
July 26, 1951, can secure a further upward adjustment if his operating cost
statement for the first half of 1951 fails fully to reflect the wage boost. Since
the calculation is based upon the seller's entire business, it must be applied
to all commodities which he manufactures.
GOR 21, sometimes referred to as the "general" Capehart regulation, is
available to all small and large manufacturers who are not covered by CPR
22, CPR 30, by the services regulation (CPR 34), or by the automobile
manufacturers regulation (CPR 1). Unlike the other regulations, GOR 21
contains no easy formula for translating cost increases into higher ceiling
prices. Under this regulation a manufacturer must show, for each commodity,
the cost increases occurring since the date of the highest price received in
the period from January 1, 1950, to June 24, 1950; the cut-off for allowable
cost increases is July 26, 1951. This is the sole Capehart regulation which
provides for a complex and comprehensive statement of cost increases. In
each of the other regulations some strictness of controls was sacrificed for
simplicity, but, with respect to the diverse groups and industries governed by
GOR 21, it appeared impossible to frame a simple regulation without conflict-
ing with the basic statutory objective of controlling inflation.
71. 16 FED. RE. 11919 (1951).
72. 16FED.REo. 12869 (1951).
73. 16FED.REG. 12014 (1951).
74. 16FEi.PR. 12310 (1951).
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Autos and serzices. These supplementary regulations cover all manufac-
turing areas of the economy except three. One of these is automobile manu-
facturing, to which OPS applied the Capehart formula in regulation SR 1
to CPR 1.75 This regulation varies from SR 17 to CPR 22 because it grants
considerably more flexibility to the industry. The manufacturer is not saddled
with a precise formula, but is permitted to propose a method for calculating
changes in net cost and for computing overhead. The propriety of this flexi-
bility was based upon the small number of sellers in the industry and the
different accounting systems maintained by several of the manufacturers.
OPS proposed to carry the burden of examining the calculations of the
manufacturers and consequently reserved the right to modify the ceilings
calculated by the industry. OPS was generous in granting the Capehart relief
claimed by auto manufacturers; in this area at least there is some evidence
that the agency's willingness to adapt the Capehart regulation to the industry's
convenience resulted in a sacrifice of price stabilization objectives.
The second uncovered area was that of industrial services. Although the
Capehart amendment was by its terms applicable to "any person subject to
a ceiling price," except sellers of agricultural commodities, the legislative
history made it abundantly clear that this form of relief was not available
to wholesalers and retailers. There was also some legislative history to in-
dicate that among producers of services, only industrial producers were to
benefit, although here the background was more ambiguous. Hence OPS
determined to exclude distributors of materials, such as chain and depart-
ment stores, from the operation of Capehart but to extend this form of relief
to all sellers of services. By Amendment 2 to CPR 34,70 issued January 9,
1952, the obligation to provide Capehart relief for sellers of services was
acknowledged. CPR 34, which governs services, already contained an in-
dividual adjustment provision, and the Director simply made a finding that
the amended provision "generally afforded so-called Capehart relief to the
fullest extent practicable." The general standard in this provision provides
for an increase in ceilings N,here impairment of the applicant's normal pre-
Korean earnings threaten the company's effective operation, although caus-
ing no actual loss. The amendment to CPR 34 also provided that sellers
believing themselves entitled to a further increase can present their case to
OPS. The decision against working out a new adjustment formula rested
upon two considerations: there was evidence that the existing individual
pricing provision was, in actual operation, as generous as the Capehart amend-
ment required; and because of the varied and sometimes inadequate cost
accounting systems found in the service trades, the computations would be too
difficult for the industry to make and too burdensome for OPS to analyze.
Here, too, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a liberal administration
75. 16 FED. REG. 12389 (1951).
76. 17 FED. REG. 288 (1952).
[Vol. 62:1
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
of the adjustment provision of CPR 34 may have sacrificed stabilization
objectives in exchange for convenience to the industry and the Agency.
The third area to be covered by Capehart regulation was that of steel.
The steel dispute and the breach in the Industry Earnings Standard. The
"general" Capehart regulation, GOR 21, had provided the steel industry
with the individual adjustment machinery ordered by Capehart's third sen-
tence. Yet the industry preferred an industry-wide ceiling increase which
could be used in the alternative. Thus on April 25, 1952, OPS issued SR 100
to the GCPR, providing a general increase-for all steel products--of 2.6
percent over the general freeze ceilings. 77  This percentage increase was
based upon the average amount of $2.84 in Capehart relief which OPS
accountants found appropriate for carbon steel. Most steel producers are
governed by a voluntary pricing agreenent entered into under Section 402(a)
of the Act, rather than the mandatory freeze regulation. Yet, unfazed by
the conceptual impossibility of attaching a supplementary regulation to a
voluntary agreement, SR 100 provided the increase for all producers.
Capehart relief did not satisfy the steel industry. But its demands for
higher ceilings ran into OPS assertions that the Industry Earnings Standard
barred price increases over those required by Capehart" 8 As a result, steel
representatives "--along with witnesses from other industries 80-appeared
at the Congressional hearings on the 1952 amendments to challenge the
Standard. And Senators Chavez and Schoeppel and Congressman Talle
attempted, unsuccessfully, to gain approval of bills which would by-pass the
Standard. But OPS felt that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
at least, favored the Standard and that it might even agree to alter Capehart
in the agency's favor. While Capehart modification was not in fact forth-
coming, the Senate Committee stuck by the Industry Earnings Standard in
subsequent hearings concerning the Wage Stabilization Board's recommenda-
tions for the steel industry. And, at a later date, Congress refused to amend
the statute to modify the Standard.
Damage to the Industry Earnings Standard came not from Congress but
from the Administration, which was faced with the steel strike and with the
industry's refusal to budge on a wage increase until it could be assured of a
77. 17 FED. REG. 3786 (1952).
78. See particularly the testimony of Roger Putnam, Economic Stabilization Ad-
ministrator, and of Ellis Arnall, Director of Price Stabilization, in Hearings, .supra note
6, at 1961-2471. See also statement of Ellis Arnall of April 16, 1952, before Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, recorded in SrN. Doc. No. 118, 82d Cong., 2d Ses.
(1952).
79. Testimony of Ben Moreell in Hearings, supra note 6, at 2179-2233; and testimony
of C. L. Austin in Hearings before House Committee on Banking and Currency on HIR.
6546, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1198-1236 (1952).
80. Hearings, supra note 6, at 235, 403, 422-5, 1007. See also Hearings before House
Committee, supra note 79, at 976, 982-3, 1013-5, 1202-6.
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price increase above Capehart. On August 2, 1952, only six days after Price
Director Arnall had denied the Weirton Steel Company a $5.50 per ton
average ceiling boost,8 ' representatives of the union and the industry were
called to the White House to agree upon a "package settlement." The out-
come was an Office of Defense Mobilization "directive" to increase the ceil-
ing on carbon steel by $5.20 a ton,8 2 $2.84 of which was attributable to the
Capehart relief granted in April. On August 19, OPS revised its April
action to include the added price increase.
8 3
A serious breach had been made in the Industry Earnings Standard.
Although the directive stated that it was "based upon and limited to the
facts of the steel industry," the obvious question was whether the breach
could be contained. In appearances before congressional committees, Director
Arnall bad asserted that he would not give preferential treatment to the
steel industry and that a crack in the price line would force equivalent in-
creases in other areas.8 4 But he did not remain in the Government long
enough to decide that issue.
OPS decided to attempt to "contain" the price increases, limiting them
to the industries directly affected by the steel price boost. GOR 35, issued
on September 10, 1952,85 covered purchasers of steel and other products
whose ceilings had been raised by Revised SR 100 and related regulations:
steel, pig iron, copper, and aluminum. GOR 35 provided secondary processors
at each subsequent stage of production with an exact dollars-and-cents "pass
through"; ceilings are to be adjusted automatically without any of the "cost
absorption" which might otherwise be required by the Industry Earnings
Standard. Subsequently, resellers of these products were permitted to adjust
their ceilings in the same manner.
The efficacy of such "containment" will be determined in the coming months
by Congress, the Emergency Court of Appeals, or the Administration.
Unquestionably the steel situation presented a distinctive set of facts, and
perhaps "containment," unsuccessful elsewhere, will work in this special
factual context. In the winter of 1945 the Administration granted a similar
steel price increase over the heads of stabilization agencies. 80 Yet this did
not cause immediate ceiling increases in other areas of the economy. Even
the demise of controls in 1946 was largely attributable to the so-called "meat
81. OPS Press Release, GPR No. 1541, July 18, 1952. This letter is reproduced in
full as an appendix in Durham, The Present Statw of Price Control Authority, 52 Co.
L. Rxv. 868, 889 (1952).
82. This directive is set forth in the statement of considerations which accompanied
the issuance of Rev. 1 to SR 100 to the GCPR. 17 FED. REG. 7585 (1952).
83. 17 FED. REG. 7585 (1952).
84. Hearings, supra note 6, at 1980-1; and Hearings before House Commitiee, slipra
note 79, at 29-34.
85. 17 FED. REG. 8179 (1952).
86. See CUTLER, PRICE CONTROL IN STEEL, STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PIuCE CONTROL
(HIsTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION: OPA) 37, 60-76 (Gen. Pub. No. 6, 1947).
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shortage" of that year and to anti-controls sentiment which prevailed after
V-J Day.
The Capehart Amendment in Retrospect
The individual pricing scheme of the third sentence of the Capehart Amend-
ment came into existence along with a prohibition against price rollbacks.
Yet even the announced rollbacks were aimed at pushing prices back only to
the level of winter, 1951, rather than to the representative 1950 month which
Congress itself had inserted in the Defense Production Act.
Both the rollback program (wvith its drastic congressional response) and
OPS's own limitation on the rollbacks' retroactivity resulted in part from
Administration action in the early days of the Act. The Administration must
have been aware that early failure to impose controls might create a need for
rollbacks later. And certainly the Administration knew that OPA had ex-
perienced great difficult, in effecting substantial rollbacks. The argument
that a producer cannot plan his operations in terms of current costs and past
selling prices is not only a persuasive argument but a sound one. The con-
clusion is that when prices are advancing, the failure to set controls renders
economically and politically infeasible a subsequent attempt to capture the
price level of a period too far in the past. Yet the Administration weighed
this risk when it withheld controls in the fall of 1950.
In January, 1951, however, when OPS suddenly imposed controls, it might
have effected a successful rollback by freezing prices as of a slightly earlier
period, as OPA had done. But the general freeze was issued so hurriedly
that the Administration gave little consideration to this possibility; it froze
prices at the level of the immediate past period, December 19 to January 25.
Having permitted many producers to plan* on the basis of the swollen
prices reflected in the general freeze, OPS iwas in a poor position to effect
rollbacks at a later date. Yet some cutback seemed necessary, and the answer
to this rollback was the Capehart Amendment. Had Capehart included only
the prohibition of rollbacks, its impact would have been minimal, for the roll-
backs themselves were minimal. But the addition of the individual pricing
provision of the third sentence in effect substituted a new pricing standard
for manufacturers: it established a cost-plus basis for ceiling prices and allowed
a forward advance all along the price front.
This new pricing standard gave a new direction to the regulatory program.
OPS had originally planned but could not now effectuate industry-ide
tailored regulations containing specific ceilings, which had proved enforceable
during World War II. Instead, the agency now turned its attention to the
post audit of individual ceilings largely self-determined by individual manu-
facturers. And OPS had neither time nor personnel to ease its burden by
formulating industry-wide regulations at price levels reflecting the individual
price increases allowed by Capehart. Thus a wholly new pattern of regulation
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had been forced upon the agency by a simple sentence which did not receive
full congressional scrutiny until after its enactment.
DISTRIBUTOR REGULATIONS AND THE HERLONG AMENDMENT
Early Distributor Regulations
Even before the general freeze was issued, it was apparent that the principal
distributive trades could not "live" for long with any regulation freezing whole-
sale and retail prices as of a particular period. Changes in prices to consumers
traditionally lag behind fluctuations in processors' prices, for wholesalers and
retailers normally raise their prices only after receiving a notice of increase
from the processor, and sometimes not until a purchase is made. Thus any
past date chosen for a distributors freeze would presently damage those
distributors who, on that past date, had not yet responded to a recent manu-
facturers' price increase.
During World War II, OPA had met this problem by the use of "margin"
regulations, under which wholesalers and retailers were required to compute
their ceilings by adding historical markups to actual cost of acquisition."7
The OPS approach was similar. Under CPR 7,88 the general retail regula-
tion for consumer goods, distributors were permitted to add to invoice costs
their individual margins received for particular categories of commodities on
a specific listing date. In the "dry grocery" distribution field, OPS revived
the OPA technique of establishing, for each specified food category, a per-
centage markup which was to be uniform for all sellers.89 Since a similar
program had been the subject of much litigation and some congressional
criticism during World War II, 90 OPS anticipated attacks on its own regu-
lations.
The Herlong Amendment: Percentage Markups
The distributors' complaint. Like the Capehart amendment, the Herlong
amendment developed from fears that price control would inevitably enforce
cost absorption, although this had not yet come to pass. OPS had refused,
however, to let some distributors, such as rug ') and auto dealers, 2 recoup
their full percentage markups when manufacturers' prices increased; in these
cases, OPS had authorized ceiling increases equalling only the exact dollars-
87. See PASCHxE, DISTRIBUTOR MARGIN CONTROL IN FOOD, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CON-
TROL: PRICING TECHNIQUES (HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATiON: OPA)
(Gen. Pub. No. 8, 1947); and CARSEL, WARTIME APPAREL PRICE CONTROL (HISTORICAL
REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION: OPA) (Gen. Pub. No. 3, 1947).
88. 16 FED. REG. 5227 (1951).
89. CPR 14, 15, 16. 16 FED. REG. 10521, 10351, 10367 (1951).
90. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bowles, 145 F.2d 836 (Em. Ct. App. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 847 (1945).
91. SR 11 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 808 (1951).
92. Amendment 2 to SR 5 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 2548, 3010 (1951).
[Vol. 62:1
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
and-cents increase in the factory price. Distributor groups sought to prohibit
this policy; they feared cost absorption would come next.
The distributors insisted that they sought no special treatment, that their
only goal was to gain a legislative mandate permitting continuation of their
customary pricing practices. It was customary, they said, for distributors to
price merchandise by applying a fixed percentage markup to the cost of goods
irrespective of increases in cost of acquisition. Nor did they seek to base their
prices on a period when margins already were swollen, but were willing to
settle for percentage margins received prior to the Korean outbreak. Their
position was further buttressed by the fact that the basic OPA regulations,
as well as the OPS consumer goods regulation (CPR 7), had been built
around this pricing practice.
The distributors' argument, however, failed to account for the effect of
manufacturers' price increases. The period between June, 1950, and considera-
tion of the 1951 amendments had seen substantial increases in prices of many
commodities. If legislation cancelled the rollback program, there would be
further price boosts. Thus a guarantee of the same pre-Korea Percentage
margin would very likely swell the dollar margin. Moreover, the argument
did not point out that distributors often shade their percentage margins as
the cost base of merchandise climbs, and that unit distribution costs may
decrease as demand builds up sales volume. Finally, the distributors' talk of
cost absorption obscured the fact that agency refusals to allow the full per-
centage markup did not amount to enforced "cost absorption"; distributors
were still allowed to add manufacturer dollar increases to their own prices.
It was true that the bureaucracy had interfered with traditional pricing prac-
tices, but effective price control demanded such interference.
The amendment takes form. In contrast to the Capehart amendment, the
Herlong amendment was the creature of the House. As originally introduced,
the Herlong amendment required OPS to permit every individual distributor
to compute his own ceilings by reference to his individual percentage markups
prevailing during the pre-Korean month. All the arguments in favor of the
percentage margin requirement were forcefully presented at the hearings con-
ducted by the House Banking and Currency Committee. One of the most
influential witnesses was Rowland Jones, Jr., president of the American Re-
tail Federation, representing more than 1,700,000 non-food retail outlets. He
proposed that Congress assure each individual retailer his pre-Korea margin.03
But it was the maintenance of the percentage markup that Mr. Jones empha-
sized, as did witnesses representing automobile 0.1 and rug distributor in-
93. Hearings, supra note 27, at 1254, 1256-7; see Hearings, Mspra note 23, at 2025-6.
See also testimony of G. L. Ward, representing the National Retail Dry Goods Associa-
tion and Limited Price Variety Stores Association, id. at 1214-5.
94. Hearings, szrpra note 27, at 1186-7; Hcarings, supra note 28, at 2118-19.
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terests.95 And the statement of the National Retail Hardware Association
argued that ceilings based on dollars-and-cents markups amounted to "'prof-
it control' rather than price control."00
A similar group of witnesses had made similar arguments before the Senate
Committee, but neither the Senate nor the House Committee embraced the
Herlong proposal. The Senate Committee observed merely that the Act
".. . in its present form now requires that due consideration be
given to margins, among other factors, and your committee expects
that such consideration will be given in establishing ceilings. Where
the retailer's expenses ... go up with the cost of the product, con-
sideration must, of course, be given to these increases in costs in-
cidental to the primary increase in costs."07
The issue was brought to the floor of both houses. The Senate, by a vote of
51 to 33, rejected the Dirksen amendment, which would have accomplished
the aims of the Herlong measure. 98 In the House, where proponents of the
measure sought out a sponsor from the majority party, the Herlong amend-
ment was agreed to by voice vote.99
The bills of both houses concerning the Act's extension then went to Con-
ference Committee, where a compromise on the Herlong issue was reached
which failed to satisfy many of the amendment's proponents. 100 The Confer-
ence eliminated the requirement of individual pre-Korea margins, permitting
application of Herlong to groups of sellers and commodities, and it made the
pre-Korea percentage margin guarantee inapplicable to regulations already
outstanding. The first change allowed OPS to set uniform dollars-and-cents
ceilings for distributors, so long as the percentage markup requirement was
met, thus bringing enforcement and administration of distributor regulations
within the realm of possibility. The second change, making Herlong appli-
cable only to regulations "hereafter" issued, prevented an automatic increase
in food prices, for retail food regulations issued in the spring of 1951 were
based upon World War II margins rather than upon pre-Korea nargins.101
In addition, the Conference added to the amendment a provision which in
effect required sellers to show evidence of their pre-Korea experience. This
limited the agency's administrative burden and made it possible to discuss
price increases on the basis of actual facts rather than vague industry claims
as to past margin experience. Both houses promptly adopted the bill contain-
ing the Herlong compromise.
95. Hearings, supra note 27, at 1317-34.
96. Id. at 1983.
97. SEN. R,. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951).
98. 97 Cong. Rec. 7554 (June 28, 1951).
99. 97 Cong. Rec. 8745 (July 20, 1951).
100. HousE REI. No. 770, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1951).




Request for repeal. Although the agency fared better in the Conference
Committee on the Herlong amendment than it had on other crucial amend-
ments, the percentage margin provision was so inflationary that the Adminis-
tration sought its immediate repeal. In his special message, President Truman
had harsh words for the Amendment:
"The maintenance of percentage margins in this fashion is not
needed to assure the distributor a fair deal under price control.
What is needed-and what the stabilization agencies were provid-
ing-is a proper recognition of increases in distributors' operating
costs. But there is no reason why distributors should be allowed to
make wind-fall commissions to cover increased operating costs that
do not actually occur. There is no justification for compulsory uni-
versal application of customary percentage margins, which is what
the new law requires."102
Although no bill was introduced in either house to repeal or modify the
Herlong amendment, Price Director DiSalle nevertheless urged both Senate
and House Committees to recommend such legislation.1 3 Conceding that
where operating expenses increase, a simple "pass-through" of the dollar in-
crease in merchandise cost would be insufficient, he pointed out that in the
more typical situation, operating costs per dollar of sales either decline or
increase at a much smaller rate than the cost of merchandise. DiSalle also sug-
gested that the percentage margin requirement discriminated against certain
distributors-dealers in milk and industrial materials, for example-who use
dollars-and-cents markups. "Since these distributors do not customarily use
a percentage markup," he explained, "[the amendment] has no application
and OPS regulations may properly continue the dollars-and-cents markup
used by these distributors." Yet he predicted that the factual determination
that distributors did not use percentage margins in the base period might
stimulate continual controversy.'
0 4
But these urgings failed to move Congress. OPS now had to accept the
Herlong amendment.
Implementation of the Herlong Amnendment
The task of conforming existing regulations to Section 402(k) of the Act
(the Herlong amendment) started even before hope was lost over the repeal
request. Beginning in August, 1951, OPS issued a series of amendments
governing distributor sales of machinery, brass mill products, park, beef,
102. SEz. Do. No. 61, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1951).
103. Hearings before Senate Conanttce on Banking and Ctrrency o1 S. 2622, 7 2 d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2861-4, 2880, 2897-9, 2903 (1951); Hcarings before Hoase Committee
on Banking and Currency on S. 2170, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2194-7, 2220 (1951).
104. Id. at 2196.
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automobiles, spirits, and wine.1°5 In each case, OPS could have disregarded
Herlong by retaining the original regulation, since these commodities were
under control prior to the Amendment's passage. But it was necessary to
change regulations for other reasons, and the resulting revision had to reflect
the guaranteed percentage markup. By March, 1952, the Agency had issued
nearly fifty regulations based on Herlong,100 and the process has since con-
tinued.
The Safeway decision. The "dry grocery" regulations did not receive
immediate attention as a result of the Herlong amendment. The specific
percentage margins in these regulations were tied to a World War II period
rather than to the pre-Korea period. Even before Herlong's enactment, OPS
had announced that it would survey pre-Korea food store margins and,
where appropriate, would substitute these margins for those employed in
existing regulations. The food industry had indicated that the survey would
disclose changed relationships among margins for various commodities, partly
as a result of post-war marketing developments. But technical statistical prob-
lems and manpower shortage slowed collection and analysis of the data.
This lack of progress distressed the food industry, and particularly the
chairis, who believed that the survey would show that their pre-Korean
margins exceeded those in the existing regulation (CPR 15).107 These
sellers could not rely on the Herlong amendment so long as OPS retained
CPR 15, since the regulation antedated and was thus unaffected by Herlong.
Deciding not to wait on the OPS survey, one of the large chains seized upon
the ingenious argument that the Capebart amendment required individual
price adjustments for distributors. In brief, the argument was that Capehart
did not exclude retailers, and that in fact the third sentence was expressly
applicable to "any person subject to a ceiling price." The statute was so
clear and unambiguous, it was said, as to preclude resort to its legislative
history. And in any event, the history was at least ambiguous as to the scope
of Capehart.
The Director denied a protest based on this claim, asserting that the legis-
lative history of both the 1951 amendments and the Capehart repeal bill
supported the exclusion of retailers. 03 The major weakness of the OPS
position rose from the unsuccessful Senate bill modifying Capehart, which
expressly limited the anti-rollback provisions "to the sales of manufacturers
or processors of any materials or the charges for industrial services. .... "
This provision implied that without an express limitation Capehart covered
distributors. Thus it was not too surprising that the Emergency Court of
105. In JOINT ComdITTEE ON DEFENSE PiRODUCrION, PROGRESS REP. No. 10, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 591-4 (1951), Price Director DiSalle summarized these regulatory
actions.
106. Hearings, supra note 6, at 1288-90.
107. Hearings before House Committee, supra note 79, at 519.
108. Safeway Stores, Inc., OPS Docket No. 1015-1-P, November 29, 1951.
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Appeals held against the Director, in spite of the legislative history apparent-
ly favoring the OPS position.1$ 9 In Safewa'y Stores, Inc. v. Jrnall,110 Judge
.Maris wrote:
"The language... is perfectly clear and unambiguous. It applies,
according to its express terms, to ceiling prices with respect to 'any
material. . . .' This is the broadest kind of definition and plainly in-
cludes materials sold at wholesale or retail."
The Court's opinion pointed out that if the language was too broad, "the way
is open to correct the error by amendatory legislation."
Congress "reverses" the Safeway decision. Fortunately Congress, when
the decision came down, was considering the 1951 extension legislation.
Director Arnall promptly sought assistance in letters to the Chairmen of
the Senate and the House Committees requesting amendment."1' He noted
that 560,000 retail food stores and 200,000 non-food retailers could secure
ceiling increases under Safew'ay, posing a threat of further rises in the cost
of living and an administrative task of staggering proportions. He added that
under Capehart it would be "virtually impossible to establish or maintain
dollars-and-cents ceilings or standard markups in the distributive trades-
unless the ceiling were at such high levels as to make a mockery of stabili-
zation." The Senate Committee speedily responded to the Director's appeal
by adding a sentence to the Capehart amendment making it inapplicable "in
the case of a seller of a material at retail or wholesale.""' ' Although the
House apparently never considered the matter, the report of the Conference
Committee noted that the Senate version was accepted ;113 and the amendment
passed. Prompt correction of the Safeway decision depended on the fortuitous
circumstance that Congress wvas considering necessary extension legislation;
it might otherwise have proved difficult to generate sufficient congressional
energy to save the distribution regulations.
1952 addition to the Herlong amend n zt. But Congress did not ignore
the pleas of the "dry grocery" distributors, who had so far not benefited
from the Herlong amendment.114 Because the "dry, grocery" regulation pre-
109. The Associated Press quoted Senator Capelhart as being surprised by the
decision. Evidently Safeway was somewhat surprised too, for in Mfarch, 1952, its secre-
tary-treasurer, representing the National Association of Food Chains, recommended that
the language of the Capehart amendment be changed to make it applicable to retail
grocers. Hearings, supra note 78, at 583.
110. 196 F.2d 510 (Em. Ct. App. 1952). On October 13, 1952, the Supreme Court
granted review in this case and simultaneously remanded it to the Emergency Court of
Appeals for consideration of the 1952 addition to the Capehart amendmcnt, discussed infIra.
Arnall v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 73 Sup. Ct. 19 (1952).
111. OPS Press Release, GPR No. 1435, 'May 9, 1952.
112. S-Nx. RE,. No. 1599, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1952).
113. HousE REP. No. 2352, R2d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952).
114. Hcarings before House Commnittcc, supra note 79, at 553.
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ceded Herlong, the Senate Committee concluded that "this limitation may
discriminate between some retailers governed by regulations issued prior to
[Herlong's] effective date and those governed by new regulations." 116 The
House Committee concurred."n These observations were correct, but an
amendment making Herlong applicable to all past regulations would lead
the way to higher food prices." 7 Yet Congress approved the retroactivity
provision, and OPS implementation followed. On August 27, 1952, OPS
issued a general order, GOR 33,118 applicable to all fields except automobiles,
which contains a finding that all existing regulations meet the requirements
of the Herlong amendment. But GOR 33 also provides a procedure for
further relief; any distributor believing that existing regulations do not meet
the Herlong standards, as modified in 1952, need only file an application
containing evidence as to the proper margin or charge.
Interpretive problems. The legal puzzles posed by the Herlong amend-
ment are legion. Perhaps the most difficult of these is interpretation of the
term "margins." Subsequent to Director DiSalle's statement that Herlong's
requirement of customary percentage markups would not apply to industries
where dollars-and-cents markups were traditional, it was discovered that this
policy barred relief for some trades whose use of dollar markup terminology
obscured actual employment of percentage margins. But once it was conceded
that Herlong protected these trades, it became administratively infeasible to
require the true dollar markup trades to use a base period other than the pre-
Korean month specified in Herlong. Thus, to avoid charges of discrimination,
OPS decided to allow an industry its customary pre-Korea markup regard-
less of the markup's form. Yet even this formulation did not satisfy all dealers
in the bituminous coal industry, which was receiving dollar markups; one of
the trade associations went to the Senate Committee, alleging that it should
receive percentage markups. Supported by another and larger retail coal
association, the Director replied that the industry had always used dollar-
markups, and that to employ percentages would ignore historical pricing
practices and contradict the language and intent of the Herlong amendment.110
As an outgrowth of this testimony, the House successfully recommended that
115. Sax. REP. No. 1599, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1952).
116. HouSE REP. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952).
117. See Hearings before House Comnniftee, supra note 79, at 1499, 1503, 1606.
118. 17 FED. R G. 7852 (1952).
119. Hearings, supra note 6, at 1269. The Executive Secretary of the American Retail
Coal Association wired Senator Maybank that "[r]etail coal has always historically been
sold upon the basis of dollars and cents markups. It is impracticable if not impossible
to apply percentage markups to coal sold at retail for the reason that every variation in
mine prices either up or down would require a corresponding adjustment in retail margins
and prices. The retail coal industry is in a depressed financial condition and is in need
of OPS consideration for relief to compensate for increased labor costs but it would not
obtain such relief by application of the Herlong Amendment and in fact to apply it in
the area we represent would have the immediate effect of cutting rather than raising retail
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Congress write the agency's approach into the Act, thus guaranteeing the con-
tinuation of established pricing practices.1 -0
A related problem has been to determine the concept of what quantitative
margin is "customary." If an industry's margins in the pre-Korean period
fluctuated wildly, any one figure is not "customary." Just how firm and
established must a margin be before it is "customary"? Similarly, if some
members of an industry used dollar margins, while others used percentages,
what are the agency's responsibilities under the Herlong amendment? Al-
though OPS has attempted to supply consistent answers to these questions,
their final resolution must await litigation or further congressional action.
The Johnson Amendment: Individual Automobilc Marhups
The plea for individual viargins. Some members of the distributive trades
felt they had received shabby treatment from the 1951 Conference Committee
when it made the Herlong amendment available to "groups of sellers" rather
than to individual sellers. The testimony and the debate, particularly in the
House, had stressed the need for guaranteed individual margins, such as
OPS itself had employed in the consumer goods regulation (CPR 7).
The 1952 struggle for a congressional mandate requiring individual marl:-
ups resembled the debate of the previous year. Automobile dealers, however,
were more specific, claiming that the failure to use individual margins con-
flicted with the basic Herlong purpose of requiring maintenance of past pric-
ing practices. The existing automobile regulation contained a uniform charge
for "preparation and conditioning," which dealers could add to the price of
the fully-equipped automobile in computing ceiling prices. Dealers claimed
that this charge actually varied from $15 to $150 per car, depending upon
geographical location, the make of the automobile, and the functions per-
formed by particular dealers.'
The Lone Star statifte. The Senate Committee's bill did not provide for
individual markups for any groups of sellers. But for one group, automobile
dealers from Texas, relief was on its way. Proponents of special provisions
for auto dealers had been busy, and on July 12, 1952, Senator Lyndon John-
son of Texas offered an amendment to allow Texas merchants individual
margins. The approach, however, was oblique. The Supreme Court of Texas
had once held that use of manufacturers' suggested retail prices, upon which
the OPS regulation was based, conflicted with the Texas antitrust statute-12
margins and would spell immediate disaster to our industry. It is our opinion that the
OPS interpretation of the applicability of the Herlong Amendment to the retail coal
industry is correct and realistic and our organization supports the statement on this sub-
ject to be gien your committee by Ellis Arnall, Director of OPS... 
120. Housa REP. No. 2177, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
121. Hcarings, supra note 6, at 425-9, 1430-3; see Hearings before House Com, mittee,
supra note 79, at 1183.
122. See State v. Ford Motor Co., 169 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), aff'd,
142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W.2d 230 (1943).
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The Johnson provision would require OPS to recognize established pricing
patterns where "the antitrust laws of any state have been construed to prohibit
adherence . . . to uniform suggested retail resale prices. .... " Customary
pricing practices in Texas had taken into account preparation and condition-
ing charges, which varied from dealer to dealer. Now permitted by the
Johnson provision to fall back on these practices, Texas dealers henceforth
could price on the basis of individual margins. The Senator explained that
this, precisely, was his intention:
"The OPS has assured the junior Senator from Texas that if
this amendment is adopted there can and will be no question that
OPS will grant to the seller of automobiles and all the automobile
dealers of Texas their customary percentage margins .... ,,121
His amendment, the Senator stated, was acceptable to Senators Maybank
and Capehart. Without further debate the Senate accepted it by voice vote.12'
Four days later a House committee report concurred. 120 With both houses
in agreement, the automobile amendment passed without further debate.
The House, however, tried to go one step further. The Cole amendment,
accepted 231 to 164, allowed all distributors an individual markup. 120 In
urging his provision, Congressman Cole's only argument was that existing
distributive regulations discriminated against grocery stores. 127 OPS con-
sidered his amendment particularly damaging, because it would forbid use of
uniform markups and dollars-and-cents ceilings crucial to effective food price
controls. The Conference Committee, however, threw out the Cole amend-
ment, noting that OPS could permit individual markups as a matter of dis-
cretion.'
28
Implementation of the automobile amendment. Congress having saved the
remaining authority for a rational food distribution program, OPS now
turned to the revision of the automobile regulation. At the time auto dealers
were urging their special amendment, it had been assumed that ceilings based
on margins used during the pre-Korean month would satisfy the industry.
But shortly after enactment of the Johnson amendment it became clear that
a pre-Korea basis would force rollbacks for dealers whose margins had ex-
panded in the post-Korea months. Thus the revised dealer regulation,' 0
adopted August 18, 1952, allowed sellers to base ceilings on individual mar-
gins in use in either of two base periods: (1) the pre-Korean month (May
24 to June 24, 1950) ; or (2) the general freeze period for dealers (January
123. 98 Cong. Rec. 7206 (June 12, 1952).
124. Ibid.
125. House RRE. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952).
126. 98 Cong. Rec. 8346 (June 26, 1952).
127. 98 Cong. Rec. 8196 (June 25, 1952).
128. HousE RF,. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
129. Rev. 1 to CPR 83, 17 Fm. REG. 7572 (1952).
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26 to February 24, 1951). If during the dealer's selected period he added
certain extra charges, such as those for preparation and conditioning, this
practice could now be continued. Familiarity of dealers with their extra
charges as determined under the general freeze regulation supplied an addi-
tional reason for setting up the optional base periods advocated by the industry.
The regulation was thus even more generous than the Johnson amendment,
which had demanded only pre-Korea margins.
The generosity of the amendment and the new regulation created legal and
administrative problems making it impossible to restrict Johnson relief to
Texas dealers alone. Many Texas dealers would gain a clear price advantage
over dealers in other states, which would be particularly detrimental to legiti-
mate operators in neighboring states. Yet ceiling-violators in neary states
could easily frustrate OPS enforcement; they could defend on the ground that
the sale took place in Texas. And non-Texas Congressmen would surely balk
at a system discriminating against their constituents. Finally, in a tight market,
a price boon to Texas merchants could chamnnel more autos into Texas
markets, disrupting normal distribution and jeopardizing the prosperity of
non-Texas dealers. Strict geographical application of the Johnson amend-
ment was a Pandora's box OPS could ill afford to open.
Even issuance of the new nationwide auto regulation did not terminate
the struggle between the agency and the industry. There remained outstand-
ing civil suits against certain dealers for alleged overcharges under earlier
regulations providing a uniform nation-wide markup. In these and related
administrative proceedings 13, the industry asserted in its defense that, even
prior to the enactment of the Johnson amendment, Herlong required geo-
graphic differentials based upon pre-Korea margins. Despite the obsolescence
of the challenged regulations, OPS could not withdraw its civil suits without
inviting other industries to violate regulations in anticipation of legislative
relief. These cases and other proceedings challenging outdated regulations
now pend before several district courts and the Emergency Court of Ap-
peals.' 3 '
Looking Back at Herlong
The Herlong amendment wiped out the agency's early attempts to limit
distributor price increases to the exact dollars-and-cents increment in manu-
facturer prices; the amendment forced OPS to permit percentage markups
regardless of the cost base. Thus distributors were allowed to pyramid every
increase at the producer level. In 1951, Congress did refuse to make Herlong
retroactive, which would have compelled percentage markulps in food distri-
130. Paul *M. Harmon, OPS No. 10-3-P, filed April 15, 1952.
131. Massy v. Woods, Crim. No. 603, Em. Ct. App., June 13, 1952 (direct com-
plaint allowed by U.S. District Court for 'Minnesota); Tribe v. Woods, Crim. No. C6,
Em. Ct. App., July 21, 1952 (direct complaint allowed by US.. District Court for Utah).
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bution. But the 1952 amendments placed all distributive trades in the same
position, thus assuring increased retail food ceilings at some subsequent date.
Although OPS opened its distributor program by issuing individual per-
centage margin regulations in the non-food area, some agency officials an-
ticipated that these could some day be replaced by uniform markups like
those in the food area. Uniform markups would have permitted harmonization
of ceilings in each community; such a program seemed essential to main-
tenance of public support and understanding. Enactment of Herlong, how-
ever, made formulation of new controls in the area difficult, thus wedding the
non-food regulatory program to the individual margin technique, which
is virtually unenforceable .1 2 And although the original automobile regula-
tions were formulated on a national and regional basis, the 1952 Johnson
amendment led inevitably to a revised regulation requiring individual mark-
ups for dealers. Congress, however, has not required OPS to drop the uniform
markup system for food distributors in favor of individual markups, although
the pressure from food sellers has been great. As a result, only in the food
field can OPS effectively enforce its distributor regulations and provide a
significant retail program worthy of a sizeable allocation of OPS manpower.
THE MEAT PROGRAm
Early Regulation
Legislative and administrative treatment of meat industry problems diverges
significantly from the approach to problems of other manufacturers and distri-
butors. Meat's special status results not only from unique economic conditions
but also from two influential political factors: (1) the tendency of con-
sumers and organized urban groups to test the effectiveness of controls by
the price of beef; and (2) the influence in Congress (and particularly in the
Senate) of the livestock producing states. Thus any viable program must
receive support from both consuming and livestock producing groups. But
meat regulations must also be fair to slaughterers and processors, not only
for the purpose of insuring the "generally fair and equitable" character of
meat rulings, but also to prevent controls from blocking efficient distribution
of meat.
OPA experience. The OPS meat program sought to gain from OPA's
experience.'33 Early in World War II, OPA used ceilings only for prices
132. See testimony of Price Director DiSalle in Hearings before House Committee,
supra note 57, at 2194-7.
133. Much of the OPA experience is recounted in BING-rAi, PRICZ PoLIC' AND THE
FEEr-FooD PRomz, PRoBLEms iN PsItx CONTROL: CHANGING PRODUCTION PATTERNS
(HIsToicAL RoR s ON WAR ADmINISTRATION: OPA) (Gen. Pub. No. 9, 1947);
RussELL & FANTIN, Livestock Slaughter Controls, in STUDIEs IN FOOD RATIONING (HIs-
TORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION: OPA) 315-403 (Gen. Pub. No. 13, 1947) ; and
Hyman & Nathanson, Judicial Revdew of Price Cd,1hdl:* Tke Bdttle of the MeaO Reyu-
lations, 42 ILL. L. Ray. 584 (1047).
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charged by slaughterers and distributors, believing that ceilings on slaughter-
ers' sales would prevent substantial rises in livestock prices. Yet OPA found
that ceilings were not enough. Lax standards for federal licensing of slaugh-
terers led many new and irresponsible processors into the field. The difficulty
of enforcing price ceilings on the sales of these processors opened up an
inviting avenue for black market operations. Their illegal profits enabled these
newcomers to bid up livestock prices and thus attract meat away from estab-
lished processors and the normal distribution channels. Soon the more estab-
lished slaughterers, deprived of supplies, found themselves unable to achieve
processing volumes-and thus efficiencies-sufficient to earn the margin
allowed them under the Industry Earnings Standard. As a result, these pro-
cessors pressed for ceiling boosts.
This wartime chain of events provoked two further steps. First, OPA
established a "drove compliance" ceiling on livestock prices. This was an
overall ceiling covering all grades of cattle, with cost of the total number of
head purchased in a given period becoming the ceiling price to slaughterers. 134
Second, OPA imposed slaughtering quotas. This second step attempted
to restrict the importance in the market place of the new slaughterers who
were bidding up livestock prices and rechanneling distribution. But belated
use and abrupt legislative termination of livestock price ceilings and quotas
prevented OPA from fully testing their effectiveness and fairness.
OPS approach. Rejecting OPA's initial, and faulty, assumptions, OPS
decided at the start to use "drove compliance" ceilings on livestock purchases
and to assure beef distribution through established and legitimate channels. 10'
Thus, simultaneously with the issuance of the processor-wholesaler regula-
tion (CPR 24) 136 and the retailer regulation (CPR 25),1T the Director
issued a livestock purchase regulation, setting "drove compliance" ceilings
(CPR 23),13s and a distribution regulation (DR 1),13 9 restricting the beef
slaughter quota to that enjoyed during a normal period. This quota regula-
tion was shortly supplemented by DR 2,140 which required grademarldng of
134. Thus the liability of packers is tested by the aggregate cost for all cattle pur-
chased in a given period. See 13 QuARrrmLx REnoRT or THE Orricm or Pnicr Axmnas-
TRATIOx 2-4 (1945).
135. The authority for quotas is contained in Title I (allocations) of the Defense
Production Act, while the statutory basis for price and wage stabilization is in Title IV.
Originally the President delegated the authority to allocate meat to the Secretary of
Agriculture by Enec. Order 10161, 15 FED. RE. 6105 (1950). In turn this authority vras
transferred to the Economic Stabilization Agency. Defense Food Delegation No. 4, 16
FED. REG. 1272 (1951). And finally it was given to OPS. ESA Gen. Order No. 5, 16 FED.
REG. 1273 (1951).
136. 16FED. REG. 11813 (1951).
137. 16FED.REo. 9866 (1951).
133. 16FED. RFG. 3696 (1951).
139. 16FrD. REro. 4456 (1951).
140. 16 Fm. Rm. 3772 (1951).
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meat by slaughterers. In the price sphere, OPS looked beyond current ceilings
and provided for three future rollbacks of live cattle and distributor ceilings
equalling nearly 20 percent-10 percent to be effective at the end of May
and the remainder on the first of August and October, 1951. The first re-
duction was applicable only to live cattle, originally exempted from the general
freeze; it attempted to obviate an early price increase to consumers. Under the
general freeze, which did not cover live cattle, farm prices to slaughterers
had advanced steadily to the point where processing and, to some extent,
distributing margins had become too slim. Thus the alternative was to increase
the ceilings of slaughterers and distributors or to reduce their materials costs,
as OPS proposed to do.
The Fugate Amendment
The legislative struggle of 1951 encompassed both the price and allocation
aspects of the meat program. Concern in the House of Representatives over
the announced rollbacks on livestock and beef led to the Fugate amendment,
which was approved by the House Committee.' 41 This amendment prevented
rollbacks on agricultural commodities below 90 percent of the farm price
received (by grade) on May 19, 1951, as determined by the Secretary of
Agriculture. The intention was to cancel the second and third announced roll-
backs on beef ceiling prices. When in late June, 1951, it was necessary for
Congress to enact a one-month extension to prevent a break in controls, the
Cooley amendment barred rollbacks during that month. Then in late July,
1951, the Conference Committee added the Fugate amendment to Section
402(d) (3) of the Act in addition to the comprehensive anti-rollback Capehart
amendment, which became Section 402(d) (4).142
The Administration offered little resistance to the Fugate amendment. It
was part of a House Committee bill largely friendly to price control. This bill re-
jected the anti-rollback provision for manufacturers but also strengthened
the Act's enforcement provisions and auhorized differential subsidies. More-
over, the bill tied ceilings not to monthly determinations of parity prices but
to parity price figures computed by the Secretary of Agriculture at the begin-
ning of the marketing season. This provision, it was anticipated, would
stabilize the administration of price control on pork, since parity prices for
hogs' are subject to sharp changes throughout the year.
The Butler-Hope Amendment: The Attack on Slaughter Quotas.
The real legislative fight, however, concerned quotas, not ceilings. Both
houses entertained an identical proposal, known as the Butler-Hope amend-
ment, which provided simply: "No restriction, quota, or other limitation
141. HousE REP. No. 639, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1951).
142. HousE REP. No. 770, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 23-4 (1951).
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shall be placed upon the quantity of livestock which may be slaughtered or
handled by any processor."
Forml objections. In both houses, two general objections were voiced
against the slaughter quota program. The most telling charge was that it
limited livestock marketings and therefore would create beef shortages; the
other objection was that it prevented new persons from entering the slaugh-
tering business. OPS attempted to answer these formal objections by pointing
out that they resulted from a misunderstanding of the regulations and their
techniques.'4 3 Under DR 1, packers were prohibited from slaughtering in
any given month a greater Proportion of the total available livestock than
they slaughtered in the same month in 1950. This system required OPS to
estimate total future monthly marketings in order to assign individual quotas.
Thus if total marketings of beef were expected to be 90 percent of total
marketings for the same month in 1950, each slaughterer would receive a
quota equal to 90 percent of what he slaughtered in that month during 1950.
The use of a percentage less than 100 led some observers to conclude that
OPS was limiting total current marketings. The agency attempted to explain
that this system was merely designed to divide livestock equitably among
slaughterers on the basis of the previous year's marketings, and that under
DR 1 any increase in total marketings would increase the amount of livestoch
available for individual slaughterers. The agency also pointed to the provision
of DR 1 permitting local quota adjustments where current marhetings were
running higher than the national average.
In responding to charges that DR 1 was unfair to new business, the agency
conceded that it intended to distinguish between new and established slaugh-
terers. However, DR 1 did provide for slaughterers who had invested in
facilities prior to the regulation even though they did not slaughter in 1950.
And entirely new entrants were to be granted quotas upon a showing that
the locality could not obtain the entrant's products from other sources and
that the new establishment would facilitate production and orderly distri-
bution of meat. It was hoped that these special provisions would be sufficiently
stringent to keep potential black market operators out of the industry, while
at the same time sufficiently generous to new enterprises to save the regulation
from political attack or from legal challenge.
The major premise. But behind the formal objections to the program was
the belief that it tended to trim the farm producer's return from livestock.
This belief was articulated in some of Senator Butler's arguments in support
of his amendment:
"These quotas were instituted not in order to divide livestock
equitably among the various meat packers. The principal purpose
of the Government officials-probably their sole purpose-was to
knock down the price of cattle and hogs. The authority assumed by
143. See SF.x. REP. No. 840, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1951).
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the OPS under this Section [101] has been used as an indirect means
of price control....
"By imposing these slaughter quotas, the OPS is able to prevent
meat packers from buying as many head of livestock as they other-
wise would. In effect, it takes buyers out of the market, and thereby
prevents the normal action of demand and supply from bidding the
price of hogs up to parity ....
It was difficult for OPS to argue that the quota program did not impair
farm producers' profits. Since livestock prices could rise without causing an
immediate price increase for items livestock growers must buy, producers
would gain from unlimited bidding by slaughterers. To the producers it was
not a sufficiently persuasive answer that OPS is in business to block increases
in prices-including livestock prices. In this setting OPS could only hope
that public acceptance of the meat program would be enthusiastic enough to
convince Congress that quotas were essential.
Butler-Hope passes. It was a Senator from a livestock-producing state,
Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, who rose to challenge the Senate group
which was determined to ban meat quotas. Anderson had closely observed
OPA's experiences with slaughter control. He had been Secretary of Agri-
culture in the last gasping days of OPA; and earlier, in 1945, he had headed
the Special House Committee to Investigate Food Shortages. That com-
mittee's preliminary report had noted black market expansion and the dis-
ruption of trade channels and had recommended techniques for policing the
behavior of new slaughterers. 145 With the powerful backing of this committee,
OPA had moved to establish an effective slaughter control program,140 only
to find that the new slaughterers had already become respectable pillars of
the business community and thus difficult to control.
But Anderson's account of the OPA failure and his defense of the OPS
program did not convince Congress. The Butler amendment was adopted, 47
to 33,147 and Senator Long's motion to reconsider was rejected, 53 to 27.148
The House debate on the Hope amendment, identical to the Butler provision,
paralleled the Senate fight, but with urban Congressmen carrying the burden
of defending the agency program. The House accepted the amendment, 249
to 167.149
The slaughter registration program is saved. In addition to quotas, OPS's
meat distribution program also provided a slaughter registration program
144. 97 Cong. Rec. 7461 (June 27, 1951).
145. HoUSE REP. No. 504, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 13-14 (1945).
146. See RussELm & FANTiN, Livestock Slaughter Controls in STUDIES IN FooD
RATIONING (HIsTORIcAL REPORTs ON WAR ADMINsTRATIoN: OPA) 315-403 (Gen. Pub
No. 13, 1947).
147. 97 Cong. Rec. 7465 (June 27, 1951).
148. 97 Cong. Rec. 7608 (June 29, 1951).
149. 97 Cong. Rec. 8096 (July 10, 1951) ; 97 Cong. Rec. 8803 (July 20, 1951).
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designed to prevent entry of illegitimate slaughterers. DR 1 classified slaugh-
terers, established criteria for the registration of new slaughterers, required
separate registration for each species of animal, and prohibited slaughter of
cattle, calves, sheep, lambs, or hogs without registration. As legislative con-
sideration of the Butler amendment progressed, supporters of slaughter
registration feared that the amendment's language might be construed as
sufficiently broad to terminate registration provisions along with the quota
system. Industry members seeking to ban quotas were generally against the
registration program as well. Moreover, Senator Butler of Nebraska, in
speaking of his amendment, attacked the registration program. He argued
that the Act did not permit licensing, but that the agency nevertheless had
set up what amounted to a licensing system under the allocation power.'-"
Senator Anderson seemed to agree that the Butler amendment would also
scuttle the registration program; but the Majority Leader, Senator 'McFar-
land, disagreed, as did Senators Ferguson and Wherry.~'" On the House
side, nearly all speakers assumed that the Hope amendment wiped out all
distribution restrictions. Congressman Hope himself argued,
"Let us have them all in without restrictions, just as we had
before the controls went into effect. Then everybody will have
an equal opportunity....,,r
Because both houses passed identical provisions, the Butler-Hope amend-
ment was not discussed in the Conference Committee's report on Defense
Production Act revisions. In debating the Conference bill, however, Senate 13
and House Committee '54 leaders indicated that the registration program w, as
not affected. OPS now felt more confident that the impact of the Butler-
Hope amendment could be limited to quotas. Thus when the Agency revoked
quotas, following Butler-Hope's passage, it reminded slaughterers that the
registration program was still in effect.1 5 Subsequently, DR 1 was revised
to build the entire distribution program around registration.
But ambiguity in the history of the Butler-Hope amendment soon led to
litigation over OPS authority to continue registration. In United States v.
K. & F. Packing and Food Corporation,'r5 this question was decided in favor
of the agency upon a Government motion to restrain defendant from continu-
ing its slaughtering operations without a registration number. District Judge
Knight declared that the Butler-Hope amendment did not e.xtend to the
150. 97 Cong. Rec. 7461 (June 27, 1951).
151. Id. at 7605.
152. 97 Cong. Rec. S079 (July 10, 1951).
153. 97 Cong. Rec. 9234 (July 27, 1951).
154. 97 Cong. Rec. 9360 (July 30, 1951).
155. 16 FED. Rin. 7675 (1951).
156. 102 F. Supp. 26 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
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registration program: "The language is clear. The intent is unmistakable.
The amendment relates only to the abolition of quotas."
Request for repeal of Butler-Hope. In his special message of August 23,
1951, the President sought repeal of the slaughter quota prohibition.10 7 The
President repeated the argument that the Butler-Hope amendment "puts
the black marketeer back in the meat business." In addition, he emphasized
the real issue in the quota fight when he asserted that the amendment "is
likely to make it impossible to have any successful control of meat prices for
consumers." The message followed by three weeks the introduction, by
Senators Capehart and Maybank, of a bill to reestablish quotas in modified
form and to spell out legislative standards for slaughter registration.
The Senate Banking and Currency Committee held hearings on the Cape-
hart-Maybank bill in late August and mid-September, and on September 28,
1951, reported out a substitute bill, which sought to meet the formal objec-
tions raised against the quota system.10 8 In answer to the charge that quotas
limit current marketings, the bill provided that quotas must equal at least
100 percent of livestock currently offered for sale. To meet the accusation
that OPS was slow to increase quotas in areas with abnormally high market-
ings, the bill made prompt adjustment mandatory in such areas. And the bill
accounted for the argument that the quota system discriminated against small
slaughterers-an objection pushed largely by non-slaughtering processors and
their wholesale purchasers-by providing that when and if any allocation
system is placed in operation it must adequately meet the needs of new and
legitimate sellers.
But along with these recommendations, the Committee also asked the
Senate to expand the anti-rollback provision of the Fugate amendment. The
Committee members had learned that OPS could effect a rollback on the
better grades of beef without violating the Fugate standard for price ceilings,
Such a possibility, it was reported, was "contrary to the real intent of the
Congress as your committee understands it. . . ."159 Although the agency
disclaimed any intention of effecting such a rollback, the Committee proposed
to make sure that this disclaimer stuck.
Senator Schoeppel of Kansas filed "Individual Views," which agreed to
the clarification of the Fugate amendment but which stood staunchly by
Butler-Hope. 60 He did lend further support to continuation of the slaughter
registration provisions by arguing that "[e]ven without quotas, OPS has
extensive powers to control and regulate the meat industry including registra-
tion of slaughterers, control of prices and so on."10' The Senator argued,
157. Sm-x. Doc. No. 61, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951).
158. SEN. REP. No. 840, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 6-16.
161. Id. at 14.
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however, that quotas restrict production; for support he cited Department
of Agriculture statistics predicting a drop in meat production. And in addi-
tion to restating Senator Butler's contention that quotas injure livestock
producers, Senator Schoeppel argued that quotas did not benefit small packers
or consumers:
"Another very pertinent argument against slaughter quotas is
their use to beat down prices to small farmers without any net price
decrease to consumers.
"Quotas tend to hurt independent small packers and encourage
monopoly. The proof of the pudding on this point is that those of
the Big Five packers who made themselves heard to the committee
want quotas, while a majority of independents do not....
"The OPS claims that quotas are a necessary adjunct of price-
control on meat. This raises the issue of meat prices at all levels
from producer to consumer. The price of meat is undeniably high,
but compared with the huge increases in other products, wages, and
services it is not out of line. Over the last 30 years, housewives
have paid 5.6 percent of their income for meat on the average. In
1950, when consumers spent 5.6 percent, the same as in 1939, they
obtain 20 pounds more meat per person than in 1939. In other words,
they got a better buy in 1 950."1C2
In the midst of Senate reconsideration of the slaughter quota authority,
OPS received an unexpected public relations bonanza from a segment of
the industry. In a one-paragraph bulletin dated October 2, 1951, the general
counsel of the National Independent Meat Packers Association told the
group's membership:
"PRICE CONTROL. There is a chance of beating price control
by defeating the Administration's attempt to restore the quota power
to OPS. Mr. DiSalle has said that price control on meat will not
work without the quota power. This makes it terribly important to
do everything we reasonably can to defeat quotas, if we want to put
an end to price control. I fully realize that opinion in NIMPA is
divided on the subject of quotas, but I believe that the opinion will
be unanimously against quotas if we could put an end to price control
through defeating the restoration of the quota power. It is important
for those who agree with this proposition to write their Senators and
Representatives in opposition to restoring the quota power."
DiSalle publicized this paragraph as proof "that the fight against slaughter
controls is actually a fight against the price control program itself."1c-3
But this revealing bit of evidence was not sufficient to carry the day. In
the rush for adjournment, the Capehart-Mavbank bill did not come to a vote.
The Senate twice passed over the bill, largely because of a belief that the
House would not concur: the House Rules Committee had failed to give
162. Id. at 14-15.
163. OPS Press Release, GPR No. 911, October 5, 1951.
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priority to the House version of the bill to modify the Capehart amendment;
moreover, the House had made no move to modify the Butler-Hope amend-
ment. And so the move to restore the quota authority had been killed.
Allocation Records and Gradentarking
Shortly after issuance of the short-lived quota regulation in DR 1, OPS
had issued a second regulation governing the distribution of meat. While the
principal objective of DR 1 was to channel livestock to legitimate slaugh-
terers, DR 2 aimed at equitable distribution of meat to subsequent pro-
cessors and to ultimate consumers, both military and civilian. Because of the
favorable supply situation, DR 2 did not immediately impose allocations,
but set forth the regulatory framework and required slaughterers to keep
records for possible use in a later allocation program. DR 2 ordered that
records of current deliveries' specify class of purchaser, weight range, and
grade of each cut of meat sold. In order to standardize references to quality,
slaughterers were required to employ U. S. Department of Agriculture grades
in making current sales of beef, veal, calf, lamb, and yearling mutton.
After several months of intra-agency debate over its necessity, OPS an-
nounced the first allocation system (DR 3),104 governing sales of beef to the
Military Establishment. Under this regulation, packers killing in excess of
a specified percentage of their 1950 kill must fill military orders to the extent
of this excess. Since the military expected to place orders for only the best
grades of beef, the grademarking requirement of DR 2 became immensely
useful.
Grademarking, however, was important not only for allocation records
and DR 3, but also for administration of nkeat price controls. Under the
processor-wholesaler (CPR 24) and retail (CPR 25) beef regulations, ceil-
ings were established by reference to the grades required by DR 2. After
the Director, had denied early challenges to this procedure,105 the issue was
litigated by a defendant to a criminal information in a district court in Kansas.
In this case, United States v. Excel Packing Co.,100 District Judge Hill
granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Butler-Hope
amendment invalidated DR 2, including the grademarking requirement, The
court's order also stated that Section 101 of the Act could
"... be construed as authorizing the imposition of compulsory grad-
ing and grade marking only in conjunction with the actual allocation
of meat and did not authorize the imposition of such requirements
merely in anticipation of a future need of such an allocation program.
As of the date set forth in the Information, there was not in effect
any allocation program [referring to DR 3]. .. ."
164. 16 FED. REG. 12186 (1951) ; see also Supp. 1 thereto, id. at 12190 (1951).
165. G. H. Waldock, Inc., OPS Nos. 1024-13-P through 1024-20-P, Nov. 15, 1951.
166. Crim. No. 8605, D. Kan., April 17, 1952 (no opinion).
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The contrary result was reached in a similar case, United States v. Garri-
gan,1 7 a criminal action brought in a district court in Wisconsin.
The Talle addition to Butler-Hope. More by accident than by design,
Congress, in the 1952 amendments, reaffirmed the legislative basis for the
grade and grademarking requirements. Congressman Talle of Iova, a mem-
ber of the House Committee, introduced an amendment to Section 101
to end mandatory registration of slaughterers on a species basis under DR 1.
In addition, his amendment permitted shifting from non-kosher to kosher
production without restriction and made any allocation orders under DR 2
and DR 3 await a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that all meat was
in short supply.
The industry did not evidence much interest in the Talle proposals, al-
though counsel for an association of 500 independent processors and whole-
salers appeared before Senate and House Committees to ask that OPS fully
consider small independents in any allocation programIr s OPS witnesses
argued that elimination of separate registration by species would encourage
black marketing by small new operators, for it would impede easy examination
of slaughterers' behavior lc90 OPS considered the suggested "short supply"
criterion for allocations more dangerous; it would cancel the military allocation
program of DR 3 and prevent other future allocations so long as there existed
substantial supplies of either livestock or hogs.
The House Committee rejected agency assertions and accepted the Talle
amendment, but at the same time it did attempt to sanctify the grademarldng
program; it added a proviso which would blot out the Excel decision by
ratifying the grading and grademarking regulation. As the Committee ex-
plained it:
"[This] proviso . ..makes it clear that the present grading and
grade-marking program ... is not affected by the limitation on the
OPS' authority to allocate. Apart from this consideration, the present
grading and grade-marking requirements of OPS are essential to
permit compliance ... with last year's amendment ... that no ceil-
ing shall be established ... below 90 percent of the price received
(by grade) by producers on May 19, 1951, as determined by the
Secretary of Agriculture."'" 0
The Senate bill contained no similar provision, but the Conference Committee
and the Congress accepted the Talle amendment with the added proviso.' 7 '
167. Crim. Nos. 47, 62-6, 70-1, E.D. ,Vis., Nov. 3, 1952 (no opinion).
168. Hearings, supra note 6, at 1203-6; and Hearings before House Committee, mspra
note 79, at 592-5.
169. The strongest congressional statement against the Talle amendment came from
Majority Leader McCormack during the House debate on the Conference Report, which
of course was too late to have any effect upon the provision. 93 Cong. Rec. S592 (June
28, 1952).
170. HousE REP. No. 2177, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
171. HousE REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 28 (1952); see Congressman
Talle's statement, 98 Cong. Rec. 8593 (June 23, 1952).
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OPS then amended DR 1 to eliminate separate registration by species.17 "
The kosher provision demanded no regulatory change, since there existed no
specific restrictions on different types of slaughtering operations. To meet
the amendment's "short supply" mandate, DR 1 was revised to require sales
of meat to institutional users only after "short supply" certification by the
Secretary of Agriculture, and DR 3 was also changed to limit the operation
of the military allocation.1 78
The Hotel-Supply House Amendments
Controversy over OPS ceilings on meat prices charged by "hotel-supply
houses" to restaurants and other public meal-purveyors supplies an interest-
ing example of interaction among legislation, regulation, and judicial review.
Some of these houses are "affiliated" houses, most of which are wholly or
partially owned by the largest meat packers. Others are independent. OPS
meat regulations gave independents and affiliates disparate treatment. Affili-
ates were classified as "combination distributors," which caused them to
receive a slightly lower ceiling price than that set for the independents,
The court finds discrimination. This ceiling differential was challenged
in a series of protests filed by supply houses which were wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries of Wilson & Co.,174 one of the "Big Four" packers. The supply
houses claimed that prior to controls, the price levels of affiliates and inde-
pendents were generally the same and that the differential was thus dis-
criminatory. In denying the protests, OPS replied that although it had no
adequate pre-control price information, there had formerly existed a differ-
ence in markups between independents and affiliates. Moreover, OPS main-
tained that the differential attempted to implement the Act's insistence that
the Director foster competitive enterprise, " 'including independent small-
business enterprises'... . In formulating the regulatory provision under attack,"
Director DiSalle had
"assumed that there was a strong possibility of a short supply of
beef in relation to the demand. In this setting there is every reason
to believe that the establishment affiliated with the packer will receive
an adequate supply and the independent will not be able to obtain
its normal supply. In such case, the independent's costs of operation
will increase (particularly the expenses incident to the acquisition
of beef) and a higher markup will be required to permit this type of
establishment to carry on anywhere near its normal operations."' 76
172. 17FED. REG. 6698 (1952).
173. 17FED. REG. 7428 (1952).
174. Davidson Meat Co., OPS No. 1024-1-P, Consolidated, May 7, 1951; Gotham iotel
Supply Co., OPS No. 1074-1-P, Consolidated, Oct. 18, 1951.
175. Davidson Meat Co. v. Arnall, No. 592, Enm. Ct. App., Transcript of Administrative
Proceedings 129-30, Dec. 19, 1951.
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But the Emergency Court of Appeals found the discrimination objection
persuasive, and in Davidson Mcat Co. v. Arnall '" it declared the relevant
portions of the meat regulations invalid. Concerning the agency's claim of
historical markup differences, Judge Magruder wrote:
"The data we have summarized is wholly insufficient to justify
an inference that affiliated hotel supply houses have not historically
enjoyed as high markups as have independent hotel supply houses.
Furthermore, markup data would seem to be irrelevant to the pres-
ent inquiry, since we must take it, on this record, that there has been
no historical differential in the general level of prices charged by the
affiliates and the independents competing at the same level of dis-
tribution...."
And the court was not convinced that the differential was necessary to pre-
vent hindrance of the independents' competitive position during short supply
periods:
"We fail to see how the differential would serve to counteract
this tendency. Respondent disavows any intention to put the affiliated
hotel supply houses out of business, and in the absence of any con-
tention by complainants to the contrary, we must assume that the
present ceilings are sufficient to enable the affiliates to operate profit-
ably. Therefore the parent slaughterers still have a pecuniary incen-
tive for augmenting the hotel supply business of their own affiliates.
The regulation imposes no quota upon the amount of beef which the
slaughterers may channel to their affiliates, nor does it impose any
quota upon the amount of fabricated cuts which the affiliates may
sell to purveyors of meals ......
In the judgment of those responsible for the meat program, the decision
placed the agency in a box. Adoption of the court's suggestion of a quota
system for meat might provoke a charge that the Butler-Hope amendment
was being violated. The court itself might have been willing to agree, in sub-
sequent litigation, that the type of quota involved could be supported under
the pricing provisions of the Act. However, to impose any kind of a quota
system on meat during June, 1952, while Congress was considering extension
of the Act, would invite an explosive reaction on Capitol Hill.
OPS replies and Congress reacts. Accordingly, the agency abandoned
any notions of relying on quotas, and it amended the meat regulations to
treat both affiliated and independent establishments as hotel-supply houses.
1 7T
For all fabricated cuts, ceilings were to be identical. But for primal and
boneless cuts, ceilings were to depend on their sources of supply. If the meat
were secured from independent sources, both independent and affiliated houses
176. No. 592, Em. Ct. App., May 14, 1952.
177. Amendment 12 to CPR 24, 17 FED. REG. 5457 (1952); Amendment 6 to CPR
74, 17 FED. REG. 5459 (1952); Amendment 6 to CPR 92, 17 FED. REa. 54 0 (1952); and
Amendment 4 to CPR 101, 17 FED. REG. 5456 (1952).
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would have the same ceilings; but an affiliate who secured such meat from a
parent slaughterer would be entitled to a smaller markup than the independent.
The industry did not contend that this ruling flouted the court's holding,
but it did suggest that the opinion was susceptible of more generous inter-
pretation. During the 1952 House debates on price control amendments,
Congressman Multer of the House Banking and Currency Committee was
induced to offer an amendment placing a broader construction on the David-
son opinion. This amendment required that the same ceiling prices be accorded
to both affiliates and independents, and its legislative history was to the effect
that a lower ceiling based upon source of supply would be improper. The
House accepted the amendment by a voice vote, 178 the Conference Committee
concurred, 70 and Section 402(m) was added to the Act. Accordingly, the
meat regulations were promptly amended to eliminate the source-of-supply
distinction. 180
In Conference there was added to Section 402(m) a clause stating that
equal price treatment should also be extended to affiliated wholesalers "whose
affiliation does not amount to an interest or equity of more than 50 per
centum."' 38 ' Although stated generally, the effect of this addition was to grant
relief to a single company which had protested the OPS provision barring
an affiliated wholesaler from taking a markup if it was ten percent con-
trolled.'82 This company might have eventually prevailed on an extension
of the theory of the Davidson case. Yet this legislative resolution of the question
of appropriate markups for meat distributors should lend little encouragement
to the slaughterers who contend that, under the Davidson doctrine, their
packer branch houses should have the same ceilings as wholesalers. This
contention is raised in a case soon to be decided by the Emergency Court of
Appeals. 83
The Williams Amendment: The Farmer's Share of the Food Dollar
Section 402(n) of the Act, the Williams amendment, added in 1952,
provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act," whenever
ceilings are set at the farm level, margin controls must simultaneously be
imposed on processors, wholesalers, and retailers. These margin controls
are to allow "the normal markups as provided under the Act, except that
under no circumstances are the sellers to be allowed greater than their nor-
mal margins of profit." This amendment principally affected the meat pro-
178. 98 Cong. Rec. 7863 (June 20, 1952).
179. HousE REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
180. Amendment 13 to CPR 24, 17 FED. REG. 6148 (1952); Amendment 8 to CPR
74, 17 FED. REG. 6149 (1952) ; Amendment 7 to CPR 92, 17 FED. REG. 6150 (1952) ; and
Amendment 5 to CPR 101, 17 FED. REG. 6150 (1952).
181. HOUSE REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).
182. E. W. Kneip, Inc., OPS No. 1024-22-P, July 15, 1952.
183. Swift & Co. v. Wods, Nb. 616, Em. Ct. App., 1952.
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gram because only beef and soybeans were under control at the farm level
at the time of enactment.'3
The Williams amendment was not a response to particular OPS regula-
tions, but rather arose out of congressional suspicion that the operation of
price control tended to bolster processors and distributors at the expense
of farm producers. It was believed that farmers were not fully sharing in
increases in consumers' prices, despite public outcry blaming farmers for
food price levels. Here was the perennial question of whether legislation can
assure the farmer his "normal" share of the food dollar.
The Senator persuades Congress. The history of the Williams amendment
dates back to 1950, when Senator Williams unsuccessfully offered an amend-
ment which would prohibit the establishment of ceilings which "allow any
seller a margin of profit greater than his normal margin of profit. . ... 185
His purpose was to prevent sellers from receiving an unusually high ceiling
as a result of a general freeze regulation. His second attempt, a narrower
proposal, succeeded. He sought an amendment, which eventually became
Section 410 of the Act, under which Government procurement agencies would
be required to use contracts forcing processors of chickens and turkeys to
pay ceiling prices to growers (if such ceilings existed), or else return part
of the contract price to the Government. 8 0
In 1951 Senator Williams pressed his plan further. He asked the Senate
Committee to require OPS amendment of the general freeze regulation
(GCPR) to force reduction of processors' food ceilings when the cost of
agricultural commodities declined. For administrative reasons, the GCPR
permitted processors and distributors to "pass through" such cost increases
(raise prices by exact amount of cost increment) in order to comply with
the parity requirement of Section 402(d) (3) of the Act; but there was no
downward "pass through" where farm product prices dropped. Before this
proposal was rejected by the Conference Committee, Senator Williams wrote
Price Director DiSalle that the GCPR was unfair to both farmers and con-
sumers; Mr. DiSalle replied that he wished to prevent windfall profits but
did not believe a regulation providing for upward and downward ceiling
fluctuations would be workable or enforceable.
Renewing his arguments during the 1952 Senate debate, Senator Williams
introduced the amendment which was to become Section 402(n) of the
Act.'5 7 Chairman Maybank and Senator Robertson opposed the amendment,
revealing that the Conference Committee had rejected the 1951 Williams
proposal on the ground that it would conflict with the Capehart and Herlong
184. Supplementary Regulation 3 to the GCPR, 16 FED. Ruo. 815 (1951), since
superseded by CPR 173, 17 FED. REG. 8767 (1952).
185. 96 Cong. Rec. 27024 (August 15, 1950).
186. Id. at 2705.
187. 98 Cong. Rec. 7181 (June 11, 1952).
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amendments.' 88 But the Senate, anxious to please the farmer, adopted the
1952 Williams amendment, and it was accepted by the Conference Committee
and became law.'8 9
Prablems after Williams. The Williams amendment has presented OPS
with a host of legal problems. The Senate accepted it with notice that it
probably conflicted in one way or another with both the Capehart and Her-
long amendments, and used language indicating that in case of conflict,
Williams is to prevail. But the most troublesome legal task is ascertaining
the content of the "normal margin" standard to be applied to processor and
distributor ceilings whenever ceilings exist at the farm level. The nearest
legislative expression is the "generally fair and equitable margin for pro-
cessing" standard of Section 402(d) (3) of the Act. In a 1945 Emergency
Court case, it was held that this standard was synonymous with the 1942
Act's "generally fair and equitable" requirement, 19 0 which also appears in
the Defense Production Act. Even assuming that the new Williams standard
is synonymous with this requirement, there remains the tricky administrative
problem of adjusting processor and distributor ceilings to reflect fluctuations
in farm prices governed by ceilings.
The Influence of the Meat Amendments
The major defect in the OPS meat program is the agency's inability to
impose slaughter quotas. No other legislative attack, however important,
has achieved the significance of the Butler-Hope amendment. To police meat
distribution, OPS has been forced to rely on other regulatory techniques.
The slaughter registration program is employed to block entry of illegitimate
processors. For a time the agency used pricing differentials to direct meat
distribution into established channels, but the implications of the Davidson
decision and the 1952 amendment which followed it have forced OPS to
revise its policy.
Although these substitute methods do not compensate for the absence of
quotas, voluminous livestock marketings fortunately have prevented black
market growth. The steer population is so bountiful today that slaughterers
are paying sub-ceiling prices for live animals, although consumer demand is
strong enough to lift retail prices up to ceiling for many cuts of beef. Yet
without quotas, a tightening of supply at the farm level would almost assure
the immediate development of a black market in beef.
CONCLUSIONS AND REcOmMENDATIONS
The 1951 and 1952 price control amendments have substantially altered
and weakened the program of regulation. In the manufacturing area, roll-
188. Id. at 7181-2.
189. HOUSE REP. No. 2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1952).




backs are prohibited, and the effect of the mandatory individual pricing pro-
gram is to permit a roll-forward of producers' prices. In the distributive
trades, sellers have been guaranteed an increased dollar margin with every
rise in the manufacturers' prices to them. Finally, in the meat industry, not
only are rollbacks barred, but OPS has also been prohibited from using the
quota power to head off the development of black markets. Supplementing
these major restraints on the price program are the grants of legislative
"relief" to specific groups of sellers.
The amendments have had a further effect, which stems from the nature
of the legislative process and the pattern of Congress-agency interaction. In
the case of most of the amendments discussed in these pages, a regulation
or a plan for a regulation has evoked legislation modifying or blocking the
specific OPS policy; the amendment has brought into being new lines of
defense against inflation, and this new agency approach in turn has come
under careful congressional scrutiny. Thus, few of the amendments purport
to deal with the basic authority contained in the Defense Production Act
of 1950. But the fact that in form these amendments only apply to particular
areas of the economy should not obscure the fact that in operation they tend
to modify the basic legislative structure. In this process of substituting its
views for those of the agency, Congress finds it necessary to set forth standards
in the greatest of detail. This particularity deprives the agency of its discre-
tion in several areas and, in addition, places upon it a mandate to carry
out these latest expressions of congressional intention. For these reasons
top agency officials spend much of their time administering and defending
their construction of the detailed amendments, and almost no time working
toward the basic purposes of the Act; nor does Congress have the opportunity
fully to consider the Act's basic economic policy or to make improvements
in the Act's fundamental plan. Soon the detailed amendments, in actual
administration, have superseded the rest of the statute. Annual renewal of
the Act, presenting frequent opportunity for detailed amendment and thus
for fresh distraction of administrators and legislators alike, makes this super-
session appear inevitable.
Although this article has focussed on the impact of amendments on the
program of controls, analysis of congressional response to other aspects of
price stabilization activity-exemptions from controls, enforcement, and ad-
ministrative procedure and judicial review-would yield a similar narrative
and similar conclusions. The Act originally exempted certain activities from
the imposition of any controls. In addition, the special agricultural standards
of the statute made controls inapplicable in much of the food area. The general
freeze regulation created certain additional exemptions, largely for practical
administrative reasons. In 1951 Congress developed further statutory exemp-
tions, while rejecting pleas for others. Then came the period of "soft markets,"
when many items began selling substantially under ceiling. Demands for de-
control led OPS to formulate administrative standards for both exemptions
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and suspensions;191 these standards underwent considerable debate during
the 1952 legislative session. The House rejected the OPS approach, the
Senate approved of it, and the Senate finally prevailed, but only after making
the major concession of exempting all fruits and vegetables in fresh or pro-
cessed form.192 In the sanctions area, the 1951 session extended new help
to the agency. The enforcement program, which is under the joint responsi-
bility of the Department of Jtistice, the United States Attorneys, and OPS,
has not been vigorous by comparison to OPA; thus there has been little
demand for shaving the agency's statutory enforcement authority. And with
respect to administrative procedure and judicial review, 03 Congress has twice
rejected an attempt to impose the Administrative Procedure Act on OPS;
but in 1952 Congress did change the standard for judicial review of regu-
lations to conform to provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.10 4
The unfortunate effects of the amending process on OPS's control pro-
gram, as well as on other aspects of its activity, indicate the need for two
basic statutory changes.
If the Eisenhower Administration is to deal effectively with the problem
of inflation by use of direct price controls, urgent consideration should be
given to a two-year statute, even if some sacrifice must be made in the sub-
stance of the Act. It was during the period from January, 1942, to June,
1944, when it was not interrupted by congressional enactments, that OPA
was able to establish a relatively effective program. Surely by this time
Congress is aware that annual renewal is not necessary for the purpose of
preventing "controls for control's sake"; if price controls, traditionally suspect
in our society, prove unnecessary prior to the expiration of a new Act, they
may be terminated by its repeal, by the reduction of appropriations, or by some
other means.
Secondly, the OPS experience indicates that to secure a statute permitting
effective price controls, we must start anew. To expect to improve upon the
present Act, with its Capehart, Herlong, Butler-Hope, and numerous other
special amendments, is to hope for too much. The renewal of debate over
these provisions will give rise to the same old arguments, both pro and con,
191. OPS Press Release, GPR No. 1585, August 29, 1952.
192. The congressional policy with respect to the suspension of controls, as contained
in Section 412 of the Act, reaffirms the administrative approach. The exemption for
fruits and vegetables appears in the last sentence of Section 402(d) (3) of the Act, and
is more familiarly referred to as the Harrison amendment.
193. Although an analysis is not extant of the significant administrative procedure
contained in the Emergency Price Control Act and the Defense Production Act, dis-
cussions of the equally significant judicial review provisions appear in NATHANSON &
LEVENTHAL, PROBLMUS IN PRICE CONTmOL: LEGAL PHASES (HIsToRIcAL REPORTS ON WAR
ADmiNsmxTON: OPA) 1-4, 76-89 (Gen. Pub. No. 11, 1947) ; and in Hyman & Nathan-
son, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations, 42 ILL, L.
REV. 584, 587-93 (1947).
194. 60 STAT. 237 (1946).
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and involve Congress in the troublesome process of ending or redistributing
special benefits.
If Congress and the country are to concern themselves with the basic
purposes of this type of legislation; if the inhibitions of the past two years
are to be laid aside; and if the public is expected to give such a program
its support, it is only by the drama of probing for new legislative solutions
that the Administration can be successful. At the beginning of every new
Administration, there is a "honeymoon" period when party responsibility
takes on a fresh look. That period is now before us; to try to live with the
present legislative structure, while a new legislative program is slowly formu-
lated for presentation in 1954, could be a tragic mistake.
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